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1. Introduction: 
Islamic finance is the only example of a financial system directly 
based on the ethical precepts of a major religion, providing not 
only investment guidelines but also a set of unique investment 
and financing products.” Islamic finance is based on Shari'a, the 
Islamic law that provides guidelines for multiple aspects of 
Muslim life, including religion, politics, economics, banking, 
business and aspects of the legal system What  shari‘a  
compliant financing (SCF) seeks to do is to shape financial 
practices and accompanying legal instruments that conform to 
Islamic law. Major financial principles of  shari‘a  include a ban 
on interest, a ban on uncertainty, adherence to risk-sharing and 
profit-sharing, promotion of ethical investments that enhance 
society and do not violate practices banned in the Qur’an and 
tangible asset-backing. 
Money, according to Islamic teachings is a measure of value, 
not a commodity. Debt is a relationship in which risk and 
responsibility are shared by all parties to a contract. Money must 
be put to practical use in creating real value for the participants 
of the transaction. It must be used to create, and not be a 
commodity in on and of itself. It because of this that the 
perception of hoarding capital, and the earning of a passive 
return on capital keyed to the passage of time, -i.e. interest – is 
prohibited. In short, money must not be made from money. 
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The establishment of modern Islamic financial institutions 
started three decades ago. Currently, there are at least 70 
countries that have some form of Islamic financial services; 
almost all major multinational banks are offering these services. 
The underlying financial principles in Islamic finance have 
remained unchanged historically since their development over 
1,400 years ago. Financial products must be certified as Sharia 
compliant by an expert in Islamic law. Certification requires that 
the transaction adheres to a number of key principles that 
include: 
● Backing by a tangible asset, usufruct or services, so as to 
avoid ‘speculation’ (gharar). Prohibition of interest payments 
(riba). 
● Risk to be shared amongst participants. 
● Limitations on sale of financial assets and their use as 
collateral. 
● Prohibition of finance for activities deemed incompatible with 
sharia law (haram), such as alcohol, conventional financial 
services, gambling and tobacco. 
Modern Islamic finance emerged in the mid-1970s with the 
founding of the first large Islamic banks. Development initially 
occurred through marketing of a steadily expanding supply of 
Sharia compliant financial instruments. 
This supply-driven model contributed to relatively slow growth 
until the mid-1990s, since when demand has increasingly driven 
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the development of Islamic financial instruments. Rising 
awareness and demand for Islamic products, along with 
supportive government policies and growing sophistication of 
financial institutions, have together raised the rate of 
growth. 
Two developments have been critical to the expansion of Islamic 
financial markets. In 1998, the so-called “Dow Jones Islamic 
Indexes fatwa” played a transformative role because it opened 
the door to a limited degree of “permissible impurity” in financial 
transactions and institutionalized a notion of cleansing and 
purification whereby small amounts of impermissible interest 
income could be cleansed or purified by donation to charity. In 
turn, this led to a series of equity investment tests that could be 
used to evaluate potential investments for  shari‘a  compliance. 
A second critical innovation was the introduction of sukuk – a  
shari‘a  compliant substitute for bonds – where capital protection 
is achieved not as a loan but as a binding agreement by the 
issuer to repurchase certain assets over a period of time. 
Sukuk has now become one of the backbones of Islamic capital 
markets and has enabled the rapid growth of Islamic financial 
transactions. 
While the Islamic finance industry represents a fraction of the 
global finance market, it has grown at double-digit rates in recent 
years. By some estimates, total assets held globally under 
Islamic finance reached $1 trillion in 2010. Islamic banks have 
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appeared to be more resilient than conventional banks to the 
immediate effects of the international financial crisis and global 
economic downturn. Some analysts have attributed this to 
Islamic banks’ avoidance of speculative activities. However, the 
Islamic finance industry has not been completely immune to the 
general decline in demand and investor uncertainty. Global 
issuance of Islamic capital market securities (sukuk), a fast-
growing segment of the Islamic finance industry, peaked in 2007 
at $35 billion, declined to $15 billion in 2008 and then rose to 
$20 billion in 2009. with Zawya Sukuk Monitor reporting a 64% 
increase in sukuk issuance to $138bn in 2012 from $84bn in the 
previous year. This follows a recovery from a low point of $20bn 
in 2008. Sukuk made a strong start to 2013 with $59bn of 
issuance in the first half of the year. 
 
TheCityUK estimates that the global market for Islamic financial 
services,as measured by Sharia compliant assets, reached 
$1,460bn at the end of 2012, up a fifth on the previous year. This 
means that global assets of Islamic finance have doubled since 
the start of the economic 
slowdown. The industry is set to grow significantly in the years 
ahead. At the current rate of growth of around 20% per year, the 
market could top $2 trillion in assets by the end of 2014. 
Assets that can be allocated to individual countries from The 
Banker’s survey reveals that the leading countries for Sharia 
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compliant assets are Iran which accounts for around 36% of the 
global market, Malaysia (17%) and Saudi Arabia (14%). These 
are followed by other Gulf states including UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Qatar, and then Turkey.The UK, in ninth place, is the 
leading Western country with $19bn of reported assets.There 
are over 700 institutions registered globally as sharia-compliant 
organisations in financial services. Of these, around 500 are 
fully compliant, and the remainder operate sharia-compliant 
products within a conventional institution. Countries with most of 
the 430 firms reporting to The Banker’s survey include Bahrain 
and Indonesia with 74 and 71 firms respectively. Malaysia, Iran, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were in a group of countries with more 
than 50 firms. 
 
The multiple reasons for the growth of the Islamic financial 
sector in recent years:  
(1) The flow of funds into Muslim oil-producing states; 
(2) Growing political and social desire in the Muslim world for 
financial alternatives to banking and investment 
institutions that have been historically dominated by the 
West;  
(3) The spreading credit crisis in global financial markets and 
the need to access new sources of investment capital; 
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(4) The growth of sovereign wealth funds and the desire to 
have  shari‘a  compliant instruments through which to 
invest them; and,  
(5) The rapidly accelerating number of cross-border multi-
jurisdictional financial transactions that are possible and 
required in a globalized world economy Assets held by 
Muslim investors worldwide now exceed $1.6 trillion, and 
that amount is expected to grow to $2.7 trillion by 2010.  
 shari‘a  compliant finance has become an accepted and 
vibrant element in international financial transactions. It offers 
a fresh opportunity to emphasize the moral and ethical 
aspects of business and finance that reaches beyond the 
Arab and Islamic worlds to prompt a reexamination of the 
core values underlying all global financial transactions – 
making available the financial resources needed to develop 
the human capital that will sustain economic and social 
progress. The main principles of Islamic finance include: 
(1) The prohibition of taking or receiving interest; 
(2) Capital must have a social and ethical purpose beyond 
pure,unfettered return; 
(3) Investments in businesses dealing with alcohol, gambling, 
drugs or anything else that the  shari‘a  considers unlawful 
are deemed undesirable and prohibited; 
(4) A prohibition on transactions involving maysir (speculation 
or gambling); and 
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(5) A prohibition on gharar, or uncertainty about the subject-
matter and terms of contracts – this includes a prohibition 
on selling something that one does not own. 
Because of the restriction on interest-earning investments, 
Islamic banks must obtain their earnings through profit-sharing 
investments or fee-based returns. When loans are given for 
business purposes, the lender, if he wants to make a legitimate 
gain under the  shari‘a , should take part in the risk. If a lender 
does not take part in the risk, his receipt of any gain over the 
amount loaned is classed as interest. Islamic financial 
institutions also have the flexibility to engage in leasing 
transactions, including leasing transactions with purchase 
options. 
It may be asked why non-Muslims would agree to use Islamic 
finance structures. The principal answer is that Islamic finance 
provides an opportunity to tap into the significant funds of Islamic 
investors seeking  shari‘a  compliant investments. In addition, 
Islamic finance can be combined with conventional funding 
sources and export credit agency (ECA) support. 
Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to 
protect the interests of its stakeholders. These interests 
may extend beyond the purely financial to the stakeholders’ 
ethical, religious, or other values. In the case of an 
institution offering Islamic financial services, stakeholders 
expect its operations to be carried out in compliance with 
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the principles of shari‘a  (Islamic Law). A corporate 
structure that enables such an institution to implement 
good governance through shari‘a -compliant operations is 
therefore essential. 
 
As the Islamic finance industry develops further, there is a 
growing need for standardisation and professionalism 
across the industry. Coupled with this is the importance of 
adopting robust corporate governance systems of 
internationally recognised standards incorporating 
transparent, fair and ethical working practices. Islamic 
financial institutions are well-placed in this context, since at 
the heart of Islamic law is a vision of social development 
which requires all individuals and businesses to conduct 
themselves ethically and in a socially responsible manner. 
The Guiding Principles demonstrate how closely aligned 
are the basic principles of corporate governance with 
shari‘a  rules and doctrines, and consequently how IFIs are 
well-placed to offer shareholders opportunities to 
participate in a broader goal of corporate social 
responsibility. 
The design of a corporate governance system in Islamic 
economic system entails implementation of a rule-based 
incentive system such that the compliance with the rules 
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ensures an efficient governance system to preserve social 
justice and 
order among all members of society. This would imply the 
design of institutions and rules that induce or, if needed, 
compel managers to internalize the welfare of all 
stakeholders. The rights that are claimed for stakeholders 
are not ends in themselves-- which ought to be recognized 
in any form of economic organization--but means for 
protecting constituency rights. In an Islamic system the 
observance of rules of behavior guarantees 
internationalization of stakeholder rights (including those of 
the society at large). No other institutional structure would 
be needed if there were complete adherence to Islamic 
rules. However, to ensure compliance to the Islamic rules, 
there is need for institutional arrangements. Therefore, it 
would be the Islamic government that should specify 
appropriate corporate governance structure, “incorporating 
all stakeholders’ rights into fiduciary duties of managers” of 
the firm on behalf of none-- investors or stakeholders. So 
no other institutional arrangement that would allow 
individual non-investor stakeholders to negotiate directly 
with the firm would be necessary. Incorporating all 
stakeholders’ right into fiduciary duties of managers would 
be counter-productive and would lead to suboptimal 
results. The important point is that each stakeholder is 
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given freedom of bargaining to protect its rights and there 
are systematic institutional arrangements in place to 
provide protection and to mediate where disputes and 
disagreements arise. 
Institutional arrangements can be part of system-wide 
infrastructure surrounding the governance structure of the 
firm. For example, because contracts are invariably 
incomplete, judicial interpretations can fill in the gaps. It is 
permissible to regard employment law, consumer law, tort 
law, as well as judicial rulings and administrative 
regulations, as part of the contracts that various 
stakeholders have with the firm. Similarly, the concept of 
shari‘a  boards is very unique to Islamic financial system. 
A shari‘a  board, consisting of fuqaha’ (scholars in shari‘a  
matters) has been used to oversea the operation of a 
financial institution to ensure that the operations and code 
of conduct of Islamic bank is according to the rules of 
shari‘a . A shari‘a  board for every firm, which is seen in 
present architecture of Islamic banking, is not efficient 
whereas only one set of rules is needed for appropriate 
corporate governance based on the shari‘a  for all firms. 
The same idea of shari‘a  board can be extended to a 
system-level board consisting of scholars from different 
disciplines including shari‘a , economics, finance, and 
commercial law, to ensure that rules are defined and 
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enforced so that economic agents fully comply with 
contractual obligations to all the stakeholders. 
This book reviews IIFS’ corporate governance (CG) 
challenges and suggests options to address them. Four 
main concerns motivate this attention to the CG of IIFS: 
(1) CG is important for economic development; (2) the 
assets of IIFS are significant and growing, (3) sound 
CG may be more critical for financial than other 
organizations, and (4) the CG vulnerabilities of IIFS 
may not have received adequate attention in 
conventional CG frameworks. 
This book is one of few papers that highlight the 
importance of studying corporate governance for 
institutions offering Islamic financial services. The 
book is of value in describing governance in Islamic 
institutions and how there are many issues under the 
investigation process, especially issues related to the 
shari‘a  Supervisory board and its functionality. 
One of the objectives of this paper is to discuss, and 
create greater awareness of, some of the crucial 
issues related to corporate governance in Islamic 
financial institutions. A second, but in fact more 
important, objective is to provide, in the light of this 
discussion, certain essential guidelines to improve 
corporate governance in these institutions and thereby 
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enable them to not only maintain their momentum of 
growth and international acceptance but also 
safeguard the interests of all stakeholders. The paper 
gives particular attention to the mechanisms for 
corporate governance, including the Board of 
Directors, Senior Management, shareholders, 
depositors, and regulatory and supervisory authorities. 
It also focuses on the effective management of risks 
and, in particular, on creating a supporting 
environment through moral uplift, social, legal and 
institutional checks, greater transparency, internal 
controls, and Shari'a as well as external audit. The 
paper also indicates briefly the shared institutions that 
are needed for effective corporate governance. 
II. Fundamentals of the Islamic finance 
 
One of the most important objectives of Islam is to realize 
greater justice in human society. According to the Qur’an all the 
messengers of God were sent to promote justice and any 
society where there is no justice will ultimately head towards 
decline and destruction. One of the essential requisites for 
ensuring justice is a set of rules or moral values, which everyone 
accepts and complies with faithfully. The financial system may 
be able to promote justice if, in addition to being strong and 
stable, it satisfies at least two conditions. One of these is that 
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the financier should also share in the risk so as not to shift the 
entire burden of losses to the entrepreneur or the borrower, and 
the other is that an equitable share of the society’s financial 
resources becomes available to even the poor on affordable 
terms in keeping with their ability to repay so as to enable them 
to realize their dream of owning their own homes, pursuing 
higher education and vocational training, and establishing their 
own micro enterprises. 
To fulfill the first condition of justice, Islam requires both the 
financier and the entrepreneur to equitably share the profit as 
well as the loss. For this purpose, one of the basic principles of 
Islamic finance is: “No risk, no gain.” This should help introduce 
greater discipline into the financial system by motivating 
financial institutions to assess the risks more carefully and to 
effectively monitor the use of funds by borrowers. The double 
assessment of risks by both the financier and the entrepreneur 
should help inject greater discipline into the system, and go a 
long way in not only increasing efficiency in the use of resources 
but also reducing excessive lending. 
Islamic finance is based on  shari‘a , an Arabic term that is often 
translated into “Islamic law”.  shari‘a  provides guidelines for 
aspects of Muslim life, including religion, politics, economics, 
banking, business, and law.  shari‘a -compliant financing (SCF) 
constitutes financial practices that conform to Islamic law. 
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Islamic finance was practiced predominantly in the Muslim world 
throughout the Middle Ages, fostering trade and business 
activities with the development of credit. In Spain and the 
Mediterranean and Baltic states, Islamic merchants became 
indispensable middlemen for trading activities. In fact, many 
concepts, techniques, and instruments of Islamic finance were 
later adopted by European financiers and businessmen. 
In contrast, the term “Islamic financial system” is relatively new, 
appearing only in the mid-1980s. In fact, all the earlier 
references to commercial or mercantile activities conforming to 
Islamic principles were made under the umbrella of either 
“interest free” or “Islamic” banking. However, describing the 
Islamic financial system simply as “interest-free” does not 
provide a true picture of the system as a whole. Undoubtedly, 
prohibiting the receipt and payment of interest is the nucleus of 
the system, but it is supported by other principles of Islamic 
doctrine advocating risk sharing, individuals’ rights and duties, 
property rights, and the sanctity of contracts. 
Similarly, the Islamic financial system is not limited to banking 
but covers capital formation, capital markets, and all types of 
financial intermediation. Interpreting the system as “interest 
free” tends to create confusion. The philosophical foundation of 
an Islamic financial system goes beyond the interaction of 
factors of production and economic behavior. Whereas the 
conventional financial system focuses primarily on the economic 
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and financial aspects of transactions, the Islamic system places 
equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social, and religious 
dimensions, to enhance equality and fairness for the good of 
society as a whole. The system can be fully appreciated only in 
the context of Islam’s teachings on the work ethic, wealth 
distribution, social and economic justice, and the role of the 
state. 
The Islamic financial system is founded on the absolute 
prohibition of the payment or receipt of any predetermined, 
guaranteed rate of return. This closes the door to the concept of 
interest and precludes the use of debt-based instruments. The 
system encourages risk-sharing, promotes entrepreneurship, 
discourages speculative behavior, and emphasizes the sanctity 
of contracts. Modern Islamic finance has existed internationally 
since the 1970s. Currently, Islamic finance represents a small 
but growing segment of the global finance industry. In some 
countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, Islamic banks are the only 
mainstream financial institutions. In others,  shari‘a -compliant 
financing (SCF)  exists alongside conventional banking. 
Estimates vary of the total size of assets held internationally 
under Islamic finance, generally ranging from $800 billion to $1 
trillion, with growth rates of 10% to 15% annually over the past 
ten years. The Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia historically have 
been and continue to be the major centers for SCF. For oil 
producers in the Gulf region, Islamic finance may offer 
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investment opportunities for their growing revenues from oil 
exports. There also has been a growing awareness of and 
demand for Islamic-based financial products by Muslim 
consumers. In 2007, Iran was the largest market for Islamic 
finance, reportedly accounting for close to 40% of  shari‘a -
compliant financial assets worldwide.6 However, according to 
some analysts, the reach of Iran’s Islamic finance market may 
be limited because of international sanctions. Following Iran, the 
largest Islamic finance markets in 2007 were Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Support 
for Islamic finance varies in the Middle East. In some countries, 
such as Libya and Morocco, Islamic banks are considered by 
some to be tied to Islamic political parties and consequently 
have been refused licenses. Other countries, including Jordan, 
Tunisia, and the Sudan, have been receptive to Islamic finance, 
viewing Islamic financial products as an opportunity for creating 
capital and fostering economic development. 
In recent years, SCF has expanded to other parts of the world. 
Islamic finance is growing in Europe and North America, areas 
in which Muslims are in the minority. In August 2004, the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) approved a 
banking license for the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the 
country’s first Islamic bank. The IBB would serve the consumer 
market with  shari‘a -compliant products. In March 2006, the 
FSA licensed the European Islamic Investment Bank as the 
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United Kingdom’s first independent bank for  shari‘a -compliant 
investments. In 1999, the Dow Jones presented its first Islamic 
market index, which follows  shari‘a -compliant stocks 
internationally. The Dow Jones maintains more than 70 indices 
in its Islamic series and is advised by an independent  shari‘a  
Supervisory Board counsel. 
A.  shari‘a  law defined 
 
 shari‘a  (or Islamic) law is meant to regulate all aspects of a 
Muslim's way of life. It is broadly divided into two sets of rules: 
one relates to the obligatory worship of God (ibadah) and the 
other relates to daily life outside the context of obligatory worship 
(muamalat), including commercial and financial dealings.  
shari‘a  is not a codified body of law. It consists of general rules 
and principles derived from the Qur'an (the Muslim holy book), 
the practices (sunnah) and sayings (ahadith) of the Prophet 
Mohammed (as discussed in further detail below). These 
general principles are capable of interpretation and 
development to address new issues or circumstances that arise 
from time to time. Indeed, the  shari‘a  has been supplemented 
by extensive Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) developed over 
centuries by different schools of thought (the madhaa'hib). The 
key point to note is that, while all the schools of thought agree 
on the fundamental  shari‘a  principles enshrined in the Qur'an, 
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sunnah and hadith, they sometimes hold differing views on their 
interpretation and application. 
B. Sources of  shari‘a  law 
 
 shari‘a  law is derived from a number of primary and secondary 
sources. 
1. Qur'an 
The Qur'an is a primary source of law and is believed by Muslims 
to contain the word of God as revealed to the Prophet 
Mohammed. Evidence found in other sources of  shari‘a  law is 
subject to the Qur'an. 
2. Sunnah 
Sunnah literally means "well known path". The Sunnah is a 
primary source of law and comprises traditional accounts of 
what the Prophet Mohammed said or did during his life 
Which have legal content. Sunnah also comprises the sayings 
of others tacitly approved by the Prophet's silence. 
3. Hadith 
A further primary source of law is the narrative record of sayings 
and actions of the Prophet Mohammed known as hadith (plural 
ahadith). The extent to which sunnah is derived or differentiated 
from ahadith depends on the context and school of thought 
being considered. 
4. Qiyas 
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Qiyas represents the process of reasoning whereby the 
principles found in the Qur'an and sunnah are extended to new 
cases by analogy. 
5. Ijma 
Ijma represents the consensus of the Islamic community 
(whether at a local or global academic level) on a particular 
issue. 
6. Ijtihad 
Ijtihad is the interpretation and the opinion of Islamic jurists on a 
particular issue. Qiyas,ijma and ijtihad are all secondary sources 
of  shari‘a  law. 
C. Issues relating to interpretation and application 
of  shari‘a  law 
 
Since  shari‘a  law is not a single codified body of law and is 
open to interpretation, the opinions of  shari‘a  scholars may 
differ on the same question of  shari‘a  law depending on the 
school of thought to which particular scholars belong. In 
addition, scholars' views on questions of  shari‘a  law may 
change over time. This can lead to uncertainty and 
inconsistency of interpretation and application of  shari‘a  law 
across the Islamic world. 
1. Key  shari‘a  principles and prohibitions 
relevant to finance  
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There are a number of key  shari‘a  principles and prohibitions 
relevant to finance and commercial transactions which 
distinguish Islamic finance from the conventional forms. For 
completeness, it should be mentioned that there are two main 
branches within Islam: sunnism and shiaism. The majority of 
Muslims are sunni and the following is limited to the discussion 
of the general  shari‘a  principles relating to Islamic finance 
within sunni jurisprudence. The key  shari‘a  principles which 
underpin Islamic finance, and have led to the creation of a 
separate finance industry, are as follows: 
a) Prohibition on usury and interest 
(riba) 
Prohibition of interest. Prohibition of riba, a term literally 
meaning “an excess” and interpreted as “any unjustifiable 
increase of capital whether in loans or sales” is the central tenet 
of the system. More precisely, any positive, fixed, predetermined 
rate tied to the maturity and the amount of principal (i.e., 
guaranteed regardless of the performance of the investment) is 
considered riba and is prohibited. The general consensus 
among Islamic scholars is that riba covers not only 
Usury but also the charging of “interest” as widely practiced. 
This prohibition is based on arguments of social justice, equality, 
and property rights. Islam encourages the earning of profits but 
forbids the charging of interest because profits, determined ex 
post, symbolize successful entrepreneurship and creation of 
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additional wealth whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost 
that is accrued irrespective of the outcome of business 
operations and may not create wealth if there are business 
losses. Social justice demands that borrowers and lenders 
share rewards as well as losses in an equitable fashion and that 
the process of wealth accumulation and distribution in the 
economy be fair and representative of true productivity. 
Under the  shari‘a , it is not permissible to charge, pay or receive 
interest. The  shari‘a  does not recognize the time value of 
money and it is therefore not permissible to make money by 
lending it. Money must be used to create real economic value 
and it is only permissible to earn a return from investing money 
in permissible commercial activities which involve the financier 
or investor taking some commercial risk. This prohibition is the 
main driving force behind the development of the modern 
Islamic finance industry. Riba can take one of two forms: riba al-
naseeyah and riba al-fadl. 
1- Riba al-naseeyah is the amount of excess received by a 
lender in addition to the capital amount lent. This type of riba is 
comparable to the traditional concept of interest in conventional 
lending 
activities. 
2- The second type, riba al-fadl, is excess compensation without 
any form of consideration in return. 
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In modern finance, riba al-fadl could be applicable to several 
exchange of commodities contracts. 
The idea is that when compensation is paid, it should be justified 
or be set against a specific activity and the return should also be 
associated with a specific risk. Therefore when parties 
exchange commodities of similar value and one party pays 
excessive compensation to the other party, this is 
Considered riba. 
b) Prohibition on realising a gain from 
speculation (mayseer) 
 
It is not permissible to earn a profit from speculation. Gambling 
is therefore not permitted under  shari‘a . Any contracts or 
arrangements which involve speculation are also not permitted. 
That said, it is accepted under the  shari‘a  that there is an 
element of speculation in most commercial arrangements and, 
unlike the absolute prohibition of interest, it is a question of the 
degree of speculation involved and whether the intention behind 
the transaction is to realise a gain from some productive effort 
or purely speculation. 
The distinction between prohibited speculation and legitimate 
commercial speculation is not always clear in practice and there 
are examples where it can be difficult to distinguish between the 
two. For example, it is generally accepted that it is permissible 
to make an equity investment in a company 
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Engaging in a business activity that is permissible under the  
shari‘a  with a view to realising future dividends and capital gains 
on the investment. There is of course a degree of commercial 
speculation involved about the future prospects of the company 
when an investor makes an equity investment, but whether such 
speculation is permissible or not would depend on the intention 
of the investor, i.e. was the intention to make a quick profit by 
speculating in the likely movement of the share price over a very 
short period of time (as is arguably the case with day trading), 
or was the decision made on the basis of careful evaluation of 
the company's past results and future prospects? 
At the other end of the spectrum, equity derivatives such as 
index-linked derivatives are generally viewed as unacceptable 
under  shari‘a  because they involve speculation on the 
movement of an equity index. 
c) No uncertainty (gharar) in 
commercial transactions 
 
Certainty of terms in any transaction is a key requirement under 
the  shari‘a . Again, as with speculation, a degree of commercial 
uncertainty is acceptable but there must not be any uncertainty 
about the key terms of the transaction. For example, in a 
transaction for the sale of assets, the sale contract should set 
out a clear description of the assets being sold, the sale price 
and the time for delivering the assets to the purchaser. Similarly, 
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a leasing contract needs to set out clearly the assets which are 
being leased, the duration of the lease and the rent payable 
under the lease. One of the reasons that conventional insurance 
contracts are not considered permissible under the  shari‘a  is 
that there is no certainty as to when a claim will be paid, given 
that there is no way of knowing if and when the insured event 
will occur. 
In the context of modern day Islamic finance, key examples of 
gharar are: 
(a) Advising a customer to buy shares of a particular company 
that is the subject of a takeover bid, on the grounds that its share 
price can be expected to rise; 
(b) Buying a house, the price of which is to be specified in the 
future; 
(c) When the subject matter or specifications to a contract are 
unknown; and  
(d) Deferred payment under a contract where the deferment is 
for an unknown period. 
d) All activity must be for permitted 
purposes (halal) 
 
Muslims must not engage in (or derive any benefit from) 
activities which are prohibited under the  shari‘a . It is therefore 
not permissible for Muslims to invest in businesses which 
engage in prohibited activities such as casinos, a breweries or a 
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factories making pork products. It is also not permissible for 
Islamic banks to provide any financing to such businesses. 
However, a very strict interpretation of these rules would mean 
that Muslims would only be able to invest in a very limited 
number of businesses internationally. For example, it would not 
be permissible for Muslims to invest in a hotel that serve alcohol, 
a food company which also manufactures pork products as part 
of its product range or any business that lends or borrows money 
at interest. 
In light of the practical considerations of international commerce 
and in order to enable Muslim investors to participate in it, a 
number of prominent  shari‘a  scholars have advanced the view 
that it is permissible for Muslims to invest in businesses or 
companies which are not entirely  shari‘a  compliant so long as 
certain conditions are met. These conditions include (among 
other things): 
(a) The principal business activity must be permissible under  
shari‘a ; 
(b) Any income derived from prohibited activities should only 
form a small percentage of the overall income of the company 
or business (this percentage ranges from 5 to 20 per cent. Of 
overall income depending upon the nature of the prohibited 
activity and the  shari‘a  scholars involved); 
(c) The aggregate amount of interest-bearing debt incurred by a 
company or business must not exceed a certain percentage of 
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its assets or market capitalisation (there are disagreements 
between  shari‘a  scholars as to what percentage is acceptable 
and it ranges from 25 to 35 per cent. of total assets or market 
capitalisation depending upon the scholars involved); and  
(d) The accounts receivable of the company on the business 
must not exceed a certain percentage of its assets or market 
capitalisation (usually set between 25 and 33 per cent.). 
e) Making Money from Money is not 
Permissible 
One of the wrong presumptions on which all theories of interest 
are based is that money is a commodity. It is, therefore, argued 
that just as a merchant can sell his commodity for a higher price 
than his cost, he can also sell his money for a higher price than 
its face value, or just as he can lease his property and can 
charge a rent against it, he can also lend his money and can 
claim interest thereupon. Islamic principles, however, do not 
subscribe to this presumption. Money and commodity have 
different characteristics and, therefore, they are treated 
differently. 
The basic points of difference between money and 
commodity:- 
(a) Money has no intrinsic utility. It cannot be utilized in direct 
fulfillment of human needs. It can only be used for acquiring 
some goods or services. A commodity, on the other hand, has 
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intrinsic utility and can be utilized directly without exchanging it 
for some other thing. 
(b) Commodities can be of different qualities while money has 
no quality except that it is a measure of value or a medium of 
exchange. Therefore, all the units of money of the same 
denomination, are hundred per cent equal to each other. An old 
and dirty note of SR.100 has the same value as a brand new 
note of SR.100. 
(c) In commodities, the transactions of sale and purchase are 
effected on an identified particular commodity. If A has 
purchased a particular car by pinpointing it, and seller has 
agreed, he deserves to receive the same car. The seller cannot 
compel him to take the delivery of another car, though of the 
same type or quality. Money, on the contrary, cannot be 
pinpointed in a transaction of exchange. If A has purchased a 
commodity from B by showing him a particular note of 100 
SR.100 he can still pay him another note of the same 
denomination. 
Based on these basic differences, Islamic  shari‘a  has treated 
money differently from commodities, especially on two scores: 
Firstly, money (of the same denomination) is not held to be the 
subject matter of trade, like other commodities. Its use has been 
restricted to its basic purpose i.e. to act as a medium of 
exchange and a measure of value. Secondly, if for exceptional 
reasons, money has to be exchanged for money or it is 
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borrowed, the payment on both sides must be equal, so that it is 
not used for the purpose it is not meant for i.e. trade in money 
itself. In short, money is treated as "potential" capital. It becomes 
actual capital only when it joins hands with other resources to 
undertake a productive activity. Islam recognizes the time value 
of money, but only when it acts as capital, not when it is 
"potential" capital. 
 
2. Regulation of Islamic Finance 
Financial institutions seeking to offer shari‘a -compliant products 
typically have a shari‘a  supervisory board (or at a minimum, a 
shari‘a  counselor). The shari‘a  board is to review and approve 
financial practices and activities for compliance with Islamic 
principles. Such expertise raises the attractiveness of shari‘a -
compliant financial intermediaries to investors considering 
Islamic banking.International institutions have been established 
to promote international consistency in Islamic finance. The 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), founded in 1991 and located in Bahrain, 
issues international standards on accounting, auditing, and 
corporate governance. It has 200 members from 45 countries; 
its membership includes central banks, Islamic financial 
institutions, and other bodies in the Islamic banking and finance 
industry. Another regulatory body is the Islamic Financial 
Services Boards (IFSB), which began operations in 2003 and is 
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based in Malaysia. IFSB puts forth standards for supervision 
and regulation. Many leading Islamic financial centers around 
the world have adopted international SCF regulation 
standards.U.S. federal banking regulators have provided some 
formal guidance about Islamic products. The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued two directives 
concerning shari‘a  compliant mortgage products. In 1997, the 
OCC issued guidance about ijara (“lease”), a financial structure 
in which the financial intermediary purchases and subsequently 
leases an asset to a consumer for a fee. In 1999, the OCC 
recognized murabaha (“cost-plus”), under which the financial 
intermediary buys an asset for a customer with the 
understanding that the customer will buy the asset back for a 
higher fee. 
Standardization of Islamic finance regulations has been of 
increasing interest in the industry. shari‘a  is open to 
interpretation and Islamic scholars are not in complete 
agreement regarding what constitutes SCF. Islamic finance laws 
and regulatory practices vary across countries. The lack of 
concurrent viewpoints makes it difficult to standardize Islamic 
financing. 
Standardization also may be challenging because the maturity 
of Islamic finance markets varies from country to country, with 
some markets well-established and others that are more 
nascent. Without standardization, some industry officials 
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express concern that shari‘a -compliance risk may grow. The 
lack of standardization across Islamic finance markets raises 
legal uncertainty that a contract will not be recognized as valid 
under Islamic law by all Islamic scholars. This uncertainty has 
been highlighted by a recent dispute between Lebanon’s Blom 
Bank and Kuwait’s Islamic firm Investment Dar over whether or 
not a contract between the two entities was compliant with 
Islamic principles and if payment should be made. Many 
observers view standardization of SCF regulations as important 
in increasing the marketability and acceptance of Islamic 
products. Over the years, there have been numerous initiatives 
to improve regulatory practices. For example, in 2009, the IFSB 
published guiding principals on issues such as governance and 
capital adequacy requirements for various financial products. 
The AAOIFI is in the process of developing new standards in 
risk management and corporate governance. 
3. Basic Islamic financial instruments 
Islamic markets offer different instruments to satisfy providers 
and users of funds in a variety of ways: sales, trade financing, 
and investment. Basic instruments include cost-plus financing  
(murabaha), profit-sharing (mudaraba) ,leasing (ijara), 
partnership (musharaka) ,and for ward sale (bay’ salam), 
Deferred-payment sale (bay’ mu’ajjal) and deferred-delivery 
sale (bay’salam) contracts, in addition to spot sales, are used for 
conducting credit sales. In a deferred-payment sale, delivery of 
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the product is taken on the spot but delivery of the payment is 
delayed for an agreed period. Payment can be made in a lump 
sum or in installments, provided there is no extra charge for the 
delay. A deferred-delivery sale is similar to a forward contract 
where delivery of the product is in the future in exchange for 
payment on the spot market. 
 These instruments serve as the basic building blocks for 
developing a wide array of more complex financial instruments, 
suggesting that there is great potential for financial innovation 
and expansion in Islamic financial markets. 
There are several methods of Islamic financing. However, in the 
world of  commercial financing and more particularly, project 
financing, certain methods are more commonly encountered 
than others. These are set out below. 
 
A. Trade with markup or cost-plus sale (murabaha). One of 
the most widely used instruments for short-term financing is 
based on the traditional notion of purchase finance. The investor 
undertakes to supply specific goods or commodities, 
incorporating a mutually agreed contract for resale to the client 
and a mutually negotiated margin. 
Around 75 percent of Islamic financial transactions are cost-plus 
sales. 
Murabaha was originally an exchange transaction in which a 
trader purchases items required by an end user. The trader then 
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sells those items to the end-user at a price that is calculated 
using an agreed profit margin over the costs incurred by the 
trader. 
To be in consonance with the principles of Islamic finance 
governing exchange transactions every murabaha transaction 
must meet the following conditions: 
Murabaha transactions may be undertaken only where the 
client of a bank, or financial institution, wants to purchase a 
commodity. This type of transaction cannot be effected in cases 
where the client wants to get funds for a purpose other than 
purchasing a commodity, like payment of salaries, settlement of 
bills or other liabilities. 
To make it a valid transaction it is necessary that the commodity 
is really purchased by the bank and it comes into the ownership 
and possession (physical or constructive) of the bank so that it 
may assume the risk of the commodity so far as it remains under 
its ownership and possession. 
After acquiring the ownership and possession of the commodity 
it should be sold to the client through a valid sale. 
Some quarters have equated murabahah transactions to 
interest-based loans. However, there are many significant 
factors that distinguish a murabaha contract from a riba-based 
one. Some of them are the following: 
In the event of default by the end user, the financer only has 
recourse to the items financed, and no further mark-up or 
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penalty may be applied to the sum outstanding. This means that 
the amount to be repaid does not go on increasing with passage 
of time as in the case of amounts borrowed from conventional 
banks on interest. Also, in conventional financing, the bank 
gives loans to its clients without ever being concerned how the 
money is being put to use. 
In the event of a murabahah transaction, no money is loaned to 
the client. Rather, the financing party purchases the goods 
himself, based on the requirement of the client. This ensures 
that financing is always asset-based. In effect, this type of 
financing creates real assets and inventories. 
Another major difference between a murabahah contract and an 
interest-based one is that the financier cannot be unconcerned 
about the purposes for which the asset being leased is to be put 
to use. Conventional banks have no compunction in lending to 
gambling houses or liquor companies, or even pornographic 
filmmakers. 
Islamic principles of finance are based on a well-established rule 
which dictates that “The benefit of a thing is a return for the 
liability for loss from that thing”. Hence, in a murabahah 
transaction the bank or financier assumes the risk by purchasing 
the commodity before he sells it at a markup. 
This mark up is considered as the reward of the risk he 
assumes. Interest-bearing loans assume no risks whatsoever. 
In other words, because the bank takes title to the goods, and is 
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therefore engaged in buying and selling, its profit derives from a 
real service that entails a certain risk. This aspect lends the 
transaction legitimacy. 
Most scholars have ruled that, to serve as a deterrent to such as 
may willfully delay payments, the financer may get the buyer to 
agree, at the time of the contract, to make a pre-specified 
donation to an agreed charity in case of late payment of monthly 
installments. 
These scholars, however, caution that this device should be 
used to the minimum extent and only in cases where 
musharakah or mudarabah are not practicable for one reason or 
another. 
B. Profit-sharing agreement (mudaraba). This is identical to 
an investment fund in which managers handle a pool of funds. 
The agent-manager has relatively limited liability while having 
sufficient incentives to perform. The capital is invested in broadly 
defined activities, and the terms of profit and risk sharing are 
customized for each investment. The maturity structure ranges 
from short to medium term and is more suitable for trade 
activities.  
Mudaraba implies a contract between two parties whereby one 
party, the rabb al-mal (beneficial owner or the sleeping partner), 
entrusts money to the other party called the mudarib (managing 
trustee or the labour partner). The mudarib is to utilize it in an 
agreed manner and then returns to the rabb al-mal the principal 
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and the pre-agreed share of the profit. He keeps for himself what 
remains of such profits. 
The following rules must govern all Mudaraba transactions: 
• The division of profits between the two parties must 
necessarily be on a proportional basis and cannot be a 
lump sum or guaranteed return. 
• The investor is not liable for losses beyond the capital he 
has contributed. The mudarib does not share in the losses 
except for the loss of his time and efforts. 
• Briefly, an Islamic bank lends money to a client to finance 
a factory, for example, in return for which the bank will get 
a specified percentage of the factory's net profits every 
year for a designated period. This share of the profits 
provides for repayment of the principal and a profit for the 
bank to pass on to its depositors. Should the factory lose 
money, the bank, its depositors and the borrower all jointly 
absorb the losses, thereby putting into practice the pivotal 
Islamic principle that the providers and users of capital 
should share risks and rewards. 
Islamic banks use this instrument to finance those seeking 
investments to run their own enterprises or professional units, 
whether they be physicians or engineers or traders or craftsmen. 
The bank provides the adequate finance as a capital owner in 
exchange of a share in the profit to be agreed upon. 
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It is worth noting that this mode is a high risk for the bank 
because the bank delivers capital to the mudarib who 
undertakes the work and management and the mudarib shall 
only be a guarantor in case of negligence and trespass. Islamic 
banks usually take the necessary precautions to decrease the 
risk and to guarantee a better execution for the mudaraba and 
pursue this objective with seriousness. 
However, it may be noted that, under mudarabah, the liability of 
the financier is limited to the extent of his contribution to the 
capital, and no more. 
C. Equity participation (musharaka). This is analogous to a 
classical joint venture. Both entrepreneur and investor 
contribute to the capital (assets, technical and managerial 
expertise, working capital, 
etc.) of the operation in varying degrees and agree to share the 
returns (as well as the risks) in proportions agreed to in advance. 
Traditionally,this form of transaction has been used for financing 
fixed assets and working capital of medium- and long-term 
duration. 
Musharaka is a partnership, normally of limited duration, formed 
to carry out a specific project. 
It is, therefore, similar to a Western-style joint venture, and is 
also regarded by some as the purest form of Islamic financial 
instrument, since it conforms to the underlying partnership 
principles of sharing in, and benefiting from, risk. Participation in 
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a musharaka can either be in a new project, or by providing 
additional funds for an existing one. Profits are divided on a pre-
determined basis, and any losses shared in proportion to the 
capital contribution. In this case, the bank enters into a 
partnership with a client in which both share the equity capital- 
and maybe even the management -of a project or deal, and both 
share in the profits or losses according to their equity 
shareholding. There are two basic types of musharaka: 
i. Sharikah al milk: partnership based on joint ownership. This 
may be voluntary e.g. in the purchase of a ship, or involuntary 
e.g. as a result of inheritance. 
ii. Sharikah al uqud: partnership based on a contractual 
relationship. 
There are five subdivisions: 
1. Sharikat al Mufawadah (full authority and obligation): a limited 
partnership with equal capital contributions, responsibility, full 
authority on behalf of others, and responsibility for 
liabilities,incurred through the normal course of business. 
2. Sharikat al Inan (restricted authority and obligation): a limited 
partnership with unequal capital contributions. They do not 
share equal responsibility, and this reflects their share of the 
profits. 
3. Sharikat al Wujuh (goodwill /credit worthiness): companies 
based on the reputation of one or both parties, typically small 
scale business. 
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4. Sharikat al Abdan (labour, skill and management): a company 
based on the contribution of human efforts, no capital 
contributions, again, typically small scale business. 
5. Sharikat al Mudaraba: a mudaraba 
D. Leasing (ijara). Another popular instrument, accounting for 
about 10 percent of Islamic financial transactions, is leasing. 
Leasing is designed for financing vehicles, machinery, 
equipment, and aircraft. 
Different forms of leasing are permissible, including leases 
where a 
portion of the installment payment goes toward the final 
purchase (with the transfer of ownership to the lessee). 
 
Ijarah can be defined as a process by which " usufruct of a 
particular property is transferred to another person in exchange 
for a rent claimed from him/her". In many respects, Ijarah 
resembles leasing as it is practiced in today’s commercial world. 
The distinguishing feature of this mode is that the assets remain 
the property of the Islamic bank to put them up for rent every 
time the lease period terminates so as not to remain unutilized 
for long periods of time. Under ijarah the bank or the leasing 
company assumes the risk of recession or diminishing demand 
for these assets. 
40 
 
To be in consonance with the principles of Islamic finance 
governing financial transactions every ijarah transaction must 
meet the following conditions: 
• It is a condition that the object leased must not be 
perishable or consumable. 
• The lease is for the utilization not the consumption of the 
asset. 
• It is a condition that the subject of the contract must 
actually and legally be attainable. It is not permissible to 
lease something that cannot be delivered. 
• The lessee must ensure that the asset is used for the 
purpose it is made for. The lessee shall comply with the 
provisions of the contract. The lessee also shall not benefit 
from the asset in a way more than what has been agreed 
upon. 
• It is not permitted to lease real estate to be used as an 
interest based bank or a bar. However it is permissible to 
lease property to those whose major activities are 
permissible or halal even if they include some secondary 
prohibited practices. 
• The lessor must not only deliver the asset on time, on the 
date of commencement of lease, but also ensure that the 
lessor delivers those accessories as well which are 
essential for the lessee to benefit from the asset as per the 
norms. 
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• The lease contract must state the lease period clearly. 
Renewal terms must also be stated clearly, and things like 
the rentals for all subsequent years, after the first year, 
should not mention clauses like ‘left to the sole discretion 
of the lessor’ and the like. 
• The rental must be money. The lease rent falls due from 
the receipt of the asset by the lessee, not the date the 
contract is signed. 
• The amount and timing of the lease payments should be 
agreed in advance. However, the agreed schedule and 
amount of those payments need not be uniform. 
• It is permissible for the two parties to agree during the 
lease period to review the lease period or the rental or 
both. That is because the lease contract occurs 
periodically unlike the sale contract where the transfer of 
ownership is immediate. 
• The lessor bears the liabilities when leasing the asset such 
as damage to the asset, payment of premium cost and 
basic maintenance. 
•  There is no objection to authorizing the lessee to 
undertake all the above but the costs thereof must be 
borne by the lessor/owner. 
• The lessor/owner bears all the costs of the legally binding 
basic maintenance and these are operations on which the 
permanence and suitability of the leased object depend. 
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The lessor also bears the cost of the replacement of 
durable parts. However, it is permissible to make the 
lessee bear the cost of ordinary routine maintenance, 
because this cost is normally known and can be 
considered as part of the rental. 
• The conditions of usage of the leased items must be 
stated. The lessor must have full possession and legal 
ownership of the asset prior to leasing it. 
• A price cannot be pre-determined for the sale of the asset 
at the expiry of the lease. However, lessor and lessee may 
agree to the continuation of the lease or the sale of the 
leased asset to the lessee under a new agreement at the 
end of the initial lease period. 
• In the event of late payment of rental, the Ijarah may be 
terminated immediately. 
• The lessor may claim compensation for any damage 
caused to the leased assets as a result of negligence on 
the part of the lessee. 
Literally, Ijarah means to give something on rent. As a term of 
Islamic Fiqh, Ijarah can also refer to wages paid to a person in 
consideration of the services rendered by him/her. In the above 
discussion, the term Ijarah is used to represent the usufructs of 
assets and properties, and not to the services of human beings. 
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E. Salam is one of the basic conditions for the validity of sale in  
shari‘a  that the commodity intended to be sold must be in the 
physical or constructive possession of the seller. This condition 
has 
three implications: 
First, the commodity must be existing; a commodity that does 
not exist at the time of sale cannot be sold. 
Second, the seller should have acquired the ownership of that 
commodity. If the commodity exists but the seller does not own 
it, he cannot sell it to anybody. 
Third, mere ownership is not enough. It should have come in the 
possession of the seller, either physically or constructively. If the 
seller owns a commodity, but he has not acquired its delivery by 
himself or through an agent, he cannot sell it. 
There are only two exceptions to this general principle in  shari‘a 
. One is Salam and the other is Istisna. 
Both are sales of a special nature. 
Salam, or Bay-Salaam as it is also called, is a sale whereby the 
seller undertakes to supply some specific goods to the buyer at 
a future date in exchange for an advanced price fully paid on the 
spot. 
Here the price is paid in cash, but the supply of the purchased 
goods is deferred. The buyer is called "Rabb-us-Salam", the 
seller is "Muslam ilaih", the cash price is "ra's-ul-mal", and the 
purchased 
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commodity is termed as "muslam fih". 
The  shari‘a  allows Salam subject to certain conditions. The 
basic purpose of this sale was to meet the needs of the small 
farmers who needed money to grow their crops and to feed their 
family up to the time of their harvest. After the prohibition of riba 
they could not take usurious loans. Therefore, it was allowed for 
them to sell the agricultural products in advance. 
Similarly, the traders of Arabia used to export goods to other 
places and to import other goods to their homeland. They 
needed money to undertake this type of business. They could 
not borrow from the usurers after the prohibition of riba. It was, 
therefore, allowed for them that they sell the goods in advance. 
After receiving their cash price, they could easily undertake the 
aforesaid business. Salam was beneficial to the seller, because 
he received the price in advance, and it was beneficial to the 
buyer also, because normally, the price in Salam used to be 
lower than price in spot sales. 
The permissibility of Salam was an exception to the general rule 
that prohibits forward sales. Therefore, it was subjected to some 
strict conditions. 
Conditions of Salam: 
It is necessary for the validity of Salam that the buyer pays the 
price in full to the seller at the time of effecting the sale. This is 
necessary because in the absence of full payment by the buyer, 
it will be tantamount to a sale of debt against debt, which is 
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expressly prohibited. Moreover, the basic wisdom behind the 
permissibility of Salam is to fulfill the instant needs of the seller. 
If the price is not paid to him in full, the basic purpose of the 
transaction will be defeated. 
Salam can be effected in those commodities only whose quality 
and quantity can be specified exactly. The things whose quality 
or quantity is not determined by the specification cannot be sold 
through the contract of Salam. For example, the precious stones 
cannot be sold on the basis of Salam, because every piece of 
precious stones is normally different from the other either in its 
quality or in its size or weight and their exact specification is not 
generally possible. 
Salam cannot be effected on a particular commodity or on a 
product of a particular field or farm. 
For example, if the seller undertakes to supply wheat of a 
particular field, or the fruit of a particular tree, the Salam will not 
be valid, because there is a possibility that produce of that 
particular field or the fruit of that tree is destroyed before the 
delivery, and in the presence of this possibility the delivery 
remains uncertain. The same rule is applicable to every 
commodity whose supply is not certain. It is necessary that the 
quality of the commodity (intended to be purchased through 
Salam) be fully specified leaving no ambiguity that may lead to 
dispute. All the possible details in this respect must be expressly 
mentioned. 
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It is also necessary that the quantity of the commodity be agreed 
upon in unequivocal terms. If the commodity is quantified in 
weights according to the usage of its traders, its weight must be 
determined, and if it is quantified through measures, its exact 
measure should be known. What is normally weighed cannot be 
specified in measures and vice versa. 
The exact date of delivery must be specified in the contract. 
Salam cannot be effected in respect of those things that must 
be delivered at the spot. For example, if gold is purchased in 
exchange for silver, it is necessary, according to  shari‘a , that 
the delivery of both be simultaneous. Here, Salam cannot work. 
Similarly, if wheat is bartered for barley, the simultaneous 
delivery of both is necessary for the validity of sale, therefore, 
the contract of Salam in this case is not allowed. 
It is permissible to draw a Salam sale contract on one whole 
thing but to be possessed at different times in specific parts. 
Salam sale is not permissible on existing commodities because 
damage and deterioration cannot be assured before delivery on 
the due date. Delivery may become impossible. 
Salam is permissible on a commodity of a specific locality if it is 
assured that it is almost always available in that locality and it 
rarely becomes unavailable. 
The place of delivery must be stated in the contract if the 
commodity needs loading or transportation expenses. 
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It is permissible to take mortgage and guarantor on Salam debt 
to guarantee that the seller satisfies his obligation by delivering 
the commodity sold, which is a liability on the due date. 
It is not permissible for the buyer of a Salam commodity to sell 
it before receiving it because that is similar to the prohibited sale 
of debts before holding. It is known that the Salam commodity is 
a liability debt on the seller and not an existing commodity. 
Instead of that, it is permissible for the buyer to draw a parallel 
Salam contract without connecting it to the first Salam contract. 
Salam sale is suitable for the finance of agriculture operations, 
where the bank can transact with farmers who are expected to 
have the commodity in plenty during harvest either from their 
own crops or crops of others, which they can buy and deliver in 
case their crops fail. Thus the bank renders great services to the 
farmers in their way to achieve their production targets. 
Salam sale is also used to finance commercial and industrial 
activities, especially phases prior to production and export of 
commodities and that is by purchasing them on Salam and 
marketing them for lucrative prices. 
The Salam sale is applied by banks in financing craftsmen and 
small producers by supplying them with inputs of production as 
a Salam capital in exchange for some of their commodities to 
remarket. 
The scope of Salam sale is large enough to cover the needs of 
various people such as farmers, industrialists, contractors or 
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traders. It can cover the finance of operational costs and capital 
goods. 
F. Istisna is the second kind of sale where a commodity is 
transacted before it comes into existence. 
It means to order a manufacturer to manufacture a specific 
commodity for the purchaser. If the manufacturer undertakes to 
manufacture the goods for him, the transaction of Istisna comes 
into 
existence. But it is necessary for the validity of Istisna that the 
price is fixed with the consent of the parties and that necessary 
specification of the commodity (intended to be manufactured) is 
fully settled between them. 
The contract of Istisna creates a moral obligation on the 
manufacturer to manufacture the goods, but before he starts the 
work, any one of the parties may cancel the contract after giving 
notice to the other. 
But after the manufacturer has started the work, the contract 
cannot be cancelled unilaterally. 
However, the party placing the order has the right to retract if the 
commodity does not conform to the specifications demanded. 
Istisna as a Mode of Financing: can be used for providing the 
facility of financing in certain transactions, especially in the 
sector of house financing. 
If the client has his own land and he seeks financing for the 
construction of a house, the financier may undertake to 
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construct the house on that open land, on the basis of Istisna, 
and if the client has no land and he wants to purchase the land 
also, the financier may undertake to provide him a constructed 
house 
on the specified piece of land. 
Since it is not necessary in Istisna that the price is paid in 
advance, nor is it necessary that it is paid at the time of the 
delivery, rather, it may be deferred to any time according to the 
agreement of the parties, therefore, the time of payment may be 
fixed in whatever manner they wish. The payment may also be 
in installments. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary that the financier himself 
construct the house. He can enter into a parallel contract of 
Istisna with a third party, or may hire the services of a contractor 
(other than the client). In both cases, he can calculate his cost 
and fix the price of Istisna with his client in a manner that may 
give him a reasonable profit over his cost. The payment of 
installments by the client may start, in this case, right from the 
day when the contract of Istisna is signed by the parties, and 
may continue during the construction of the house and after it is 
handed over to the client. In order to secure the payments of 
installments, the bank, as a security, may keep the title deeds of 
the house or land, or any other property, until the client pays the 
last installment. 
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The bank, in this case, will be responsible for the construction of 
the house in full conformity with the specifications detailed in the 
agreement. In case of discrepancy, the financier will undertake 
such alterations at his own cost as may be necessary for 
bringing it in harmony with the terms of the contract. 
The instrument of Istisna may also be used for project financing 
on similar lines. If a client wants to install machinery in his 
factory, and the machinery needs to be manufactured, the 
financier may undertake to prepare the machinery through the 
contract of Istisna according to the aforesaid procedure. The 
same principles will be fully applicable to the construction of a 
building for the industry. 
Istisna contracts open wide fields of application for the Islamic 
banks to finance the public needs and the vital interests of the 
society to develop the Islamic economy. Istisna contracts are 
applied in high technology industries such as the aircraft 
industry, locomotive and ship building industries, in addition to 
the different types of machines produced in large factories or 
workshops. The Istisna contract is also applied in the 
construction industry for apartment buildings, hospitals, schools, 
and universities. 
Difference between Istisna and Salam: 
1. The subject of Istisna is always a thing that needs 
manufacturing, while Salam can be effected on anything, no 
matter whether it needs manufacturing or not. 
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2. It is necessary for Salam that the price is paid in advance, 
while it is not necessary in Istisna. 
3. The contract of Salam, once effected, cannot be cancelled 
unilaterally, while the contract of Istisna can be cancelled before 
the manufacturer starts the work. 
4. The time of delivery is an essential part of the sale in Salam 
while it is not necessary in Istisna that the time of the delivery be 
fixed. 
5. The buyer may stipulate in the Istisna contract that the 
commodity shall be manufactured or produced by a specific 
manufacturer, or manufactured from specific materials. This is 
not permitted in the case of Salam sale. 
Difference Between Istisna and Ijarah : 
It should also be kept in mind that the manufacturer, in Istisna, 
undertakes to make the required goods with his own material. 
Therefore, this transaction implies that the manufacturer shall 
obtain the material, if it is not already with him, and shall 
undertake the work required for making the ordered goods with 
it. 
However, if the customer provides the material, and the 
manufacturer is required to use his labor and skill only, the 
transaction is not Istisna. In this case it will be a transaction of 
Ijarah whereby the services of a person are retained for a 
specified fee paid to him. 
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G. Islamic bonds (Sukuk) : 
Muslim jurists subject the buying and selling of debt obligations 
to certain conditions in order to comply with the prohibition of 
riba (interest), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). 
specify these conditions in detail. In summary, the debt must be 
a genuine one i.e., it must not be a subterfuge to borrow money 
such as an asset-linked buy-back arrangement. The debtor 
must acknowledge the trade and creditors must be known, 
accessible, and sound. Trading must be on a spot basis and not 
against debt. Importantly, the price cannot be other than the face 
value. In line with these principles, early doctrine on interest-free 
finance disallowed corporate or government bonds and the 
discounting of bills. Pressures for innovation have resulted in 
finding a way out of these limitations, admitting ‘financial 
engineering’. In particular, leasing-based bonds (sukuk al-ijara) 
have been developed. Although other sukuk have been issued, 
eg sukuk al-mudaraba, sukuk al-musharaka, sukuk al-
murabaha, the ijara sukuk remains the most popular.  
Sukuk means participation certificate, and is commonly referred 
to as an ‘Islamic bond’. Techniques similar to conventional 
structured finance securities are employed, with sukuk akin to 
pass-through certificates. A sakk simply represents a 
proportional or undivided ownership interest in an asset or pool 
of assets . Islamic bonds are more useful if they can be traded 
on the secondary market to gain liquidity. As indicated above, 
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certain requirements must be met with respect to the trading 
capacity of the bonds on the Islamic financial market. 
Specifically, they cannot represent a debt (in Islam, debt-selling 
is forbidden), as conventional bonds can. Instead they must 
constitute property of an approved asset. Such a bond is 
obtained through the securitization of the asset, the property of 
which is divided into equally valued units and incorporated in the 
sukuk certificates. The value of the sukuk thus remains 
connected to the value of the underlying asset. While they come 
in zero coupon and coupon versions, the productivity and return 
is linked to the profit of the underlying asset and not to an 
interest rate (although an interest rate such as LIBOR can be 
used as a ‘benchmark’).  
Consider, for example, the case of the sukuk al-ijara. The 
originator holds assets (land, buildings, aircraft, ships, etc) that 
are to constitute the basis of the returns to the sukuk investor. 
These assets are sold by the originator to a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) and then are leased back at a specified rental. 
The SPV securitizes the assets by issuing sukuk certificates that 
can be purchased by investors. Each sukukIn what ways does 
Islamic banking differ from conventional finance?  
certificate represents a share in the ownership of the assets, 
entitling the investor to periodic distributions from the SPV 
funded by the originator’s rental payments on the leased assets. 
The returns can be either fixed rate or floating rate (often 
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referenced to LIBOR as a ‘benchmark’) depending on the 
originator.  
So far, AAOIFI (the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions) has issued Standards for fourteen 
types of sukuk .These can be broadly grouped into sukuk that 
bear predetermined returns and sukuk that allow for sharing of 
profit and, in some instances, loss. Sukuk al-murabaha and 
sukuk al-murabaha are examples of profit-and-loss-sharing 
sukuk. To date, most issued sukuk have borne predetermined 
returns, and the majority of such sukuk have been sukuk al-ijara, 
frequently at a predetermined rate of return.  
In fact, the basic structure of a sukuk is very flexible and can be 
varied in a number of ways. The underlying assets that are 
pooled and securitized can be ijara, murabaha, istisnaa or 
musharaka receivables, or combinations of them, and the rates 
of return can be fixed, floating or zero coupon. Investment risks 
(credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, market price 
risk, liquidity risk) are much the same as those of conventional 
bonds, and depend on the way the securitization is structured, 
although one unique risk is that of shari’a compliance, a factor 
which also governs the tradeability of the sukuk.  
Indeed, it is the potential for tradeability that primarily makes for 
the popularity of sukuk al-ijara. Ijara, though less commonly 
employed than murabaha as an asset in Islamic banks’ balance 
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sheets offers much greater flexibility for the Islamic bond market. 
Each security called sukuk-al-ijara represents a pro rata 
ownership of physical assets as against a pro rata share in 
financial claims or debt in the case of sukuk-al-murabaha. While 
debt can only be transferred at par, ownership in physical assets 
can always be transferred at a mutually negotiated price. Hence 
sukuk-al-ijara allow for creation of a secondary market since 
they represent a share in the ownership of a physical asset. 
In 2010 Sukuk issuances hit a record of US$47.78 billion if 
compared to the last five years; managing to surpass 2007 peak 
level by around 7% and 50% if compared to 2009. If this was to 
convey something, it would be the increasing confidence the 
global markets are regaining. According to Dow Jones Islamic 
Markets Indices December Commentary, the DJIM Citigroup 
Sukuk Index gained 9.1% in 2010 finishing at 125.32 points. 
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As at end-2012, the value of outstanding global sukuk topped 
USD 229.4 billion – a record high helped by new issuances 
worth USD 131.2 billion. Malaysia, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia 
and Indonesia feature among the countries that have been at 
the forefront of growth in the sukuk primary market. Third quarter 
of 2012 saw the debut of the first Islamic Basel III compliant Tier 
I structure, closely followed in first quarter of 2013 by another 
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Islamic bank, both from the UAE, successfully raising US$1b 
each. 
Finally, Islam has laid down a number of conditions to ensure 
that credit expands in step with the growth of the real rector. 
Some of these conditions are: 
1. The asset which is being sold or leased must be real, and not 
imaginary or notional; 
2. The seller must own and possess the goods being sold or 
leased; 
3. The transaction must be a genuine trade transaction with the 
full intention of giving and taking delivery; and 
4. The debt cannot be sold and thus the risk of default 
associated with it must be borne by the lender himself. 
The first condition will help eliminate most of the speculative and 
gambling transactions which involve notional goods and which 
constituted a major part of the derivatives transactions during 
the current crisis. The second condition will help ensure that the 
seller (or lessor) also shares a part of the risk to be able to get 
a share in the return. Once the seller (financier) acquires 
ownership and possession of the goods for sale or lease, he/she 
bears the risk. This condition will put a constraint on short sales, 
and thereby remove the possibility of a steep decline in asset 
prices during a downturn. The  shari‘a  has, however, made an 
exception to this rule in the case of salam and istisna where the 
goods are not already available in the market and need to be 
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produced or manufactured before delivery. This will help ensure 
that financing expands in step with the rise of the real economy 
and thereby help curb excessive credit expansion. 
The third and the fourth conditions will not only help eliminate a 
great deal of speculative and derivatives transactions where 
there is no intention of giving or taking delivery, but also motivate 
the creditor to be more cautious in evaluating the credit risk. This 
will prevent an unnecessary explosion in the volume and value 
of transactions and also help keep the rise in debt to be in step 
with the rise of the real economy. It will also release a greater 
volume of financial resources for the real sector and, thereby, 
help expand employment and self-employment opportunities 
and the production of need-fulfilling goods and services. 
The discipline that Islam wishes to introduce in the financial 
system may not materialize unless the governments reduce 
their borrowing from the central bank to a level that is in harmony 
with the goal of price and financial stability. Even borrowing from 
the private sector should be primarily for development that will 
increase its ability to repay. Borrowing for meeting current 
spending needs to be avoided except in extreme circumstances. 
This is because borrowing does not eliminate the ultimate need 
for sacrifice. 
Without this consciousness about the ultimate need for sacrifice, 
the need for borrowing is most likely to become path dependent. 
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A number of objections may be raised here against these 
conditions. One of these is that hedging is a genuine need of the 
economy and the restrictions specified above may stand against 
it. Genuine hedging or insurance which is undertaken by a 
person or firm to provide protection against losses actually 
incurred has been recognized by Muslim jurists. However, what 
is prohibited is ‘hedging’ that is not related to a real transaction 
and is rather of a speculative and gambling nature. A second 
objection may be that all these conditions will tend to shrink the 
size of the economy by reducing the number and volume of 
derivatives transactions. There is not doubt that the number of 
transactions will be reduced. However, it will be primarily those 
transactions which are of a speculative and gambling nature and 
are generally recognized to be zero-sum games. These have 
rarely contributed significantly to total real output. The 
compounded annual rate of growth of total outstanding 
derivatives between 2000 and 2007 was 29.9 percent per 
annum while that in total real world output was only 3.1 percent 
per annum. Hence a decline in speculative and gambling 
transactions is not likely to hurt the real economy significantly. 
While a restriction on such transactions will cut the commissions 
earned by speculators during an artificially generated boom, it 
will help them avert losses and bankruptcy that become 
unavoidable during the decline and lead to a financial crisis. 
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4. ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
The emergence of Islamic banking in recent years is one of the 
most important trends in the economic sector, and with the 
estimated 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide, it’s ripe for growth 
potential. 
There has always been a demand among Muslims for financial 
products and services that conform to  shari‘a  (Islamic Law). 
The development of viable alternatives to conventional finance 
increasingly enables Muslims to participate in the financial world 
without violating their Islamic principles and without bearing the 
economic penalty that comes from non-participation, especially 
with the recent growth of oil prices. 
Currently, the Islamic banking industry consists of several 
hundred billion dollars, and more than 300 financial institutions 
in and outside the Muslim world. There is $300 billion in assets 
managed according to Islamic principles, ranging from 
commercial to investment banks and investment funds, all 
providing Islamic products. 
Others estimate the industry to be even larger. Financial 
Services Authority, the financial services regulator in the United 
Kingdom, for example, recently suggested Islamic banking was 
as large as $500 billion. Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, 
estimates that the sukuk (deed) market has reached $70 billion, 
and will top the $160 billion mark by the end of the decade. 
61 
 
Islamic financial services are now evolving from a niche market 
to the mainstream. 
In addition to the sheer number of Muslims worldwide, global 
financial institutions are taking a strong interest in Islamic 
products since the industry is in its nascent stage. Products have 
yet to be commoditized from competition, therefore allowing 
profit margins to remain high. 
What is Islamic banking? 
Islamic banking can be considered banking with a conscience. 
Islamic banks each have a  shari‘a  board made up of  shari‘a  
scholars as well as financial experts who are responsible for 
determining what activities are and are not  shari‘a -compliant. 
Islamic banking is based on two main financial principles. Firstly, 
investment is to be made in the private sector through interest-
free financing. Secondly, the development of financial 
instruments is to be done on the basis of profit and loss sharing 
as well as sharing risks. 
Further, Islamic banking is built around  shari‘a , mainly 
prohibiting the charging of interest. Because Islam considers 
interest an unjustified increase of capital, with no effort made to 
earn it, it is considered of false value, and therefore is prohibited. 
However, there are many arguments about the prohibition of 
interest in Islam. The first argument is that interest rates have 
no moral foundation. The second is that abstinence from 
consumption is not a justification of rewards. 
62 
 
Lastly, some argue that there are risks to justify the supplement 
of payment for capital lending if the loan is guaranteed. 
In addition to the prohibition of interest payments, Islamic law 
treats money strictly as a medium of exchange. In other words, 
money, in itself, does not have any inherent value, and therefore 
it should not lead to the production of more money. In Islamic 
banking, the creditor/debtor relationship is defined differently 
than in the secular financial world. The creditor, or provider, of 
funds who becomes a partner in a project assumes the risk 
activity with the entrepreneur and shares profits as well as 
losses. 
The creation of incremental wealth justifies the share of profit 
between the borrower and the lender of money, but does not 
guarantee a fixed return. 
Some of the principle instruments involved in the 
aforementioned form of resource mobilization include the 
following: 
Trade financing and cost-plus mark-up on traded goods 
(murabaha). 
Profit-sharing (mudarabah) and equity participation 
(musharaka) in which cost-sharing among partners is also 
included. 
Rental on purchased equipment (ijara). 
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Islamic banking portfolio using secondary financing instruments, 
such as shares and stocks revolving around the above-
mentioned instruments. 
ISLAMIC Conventional vs. Islamic banking 
CONVENTIONAL  
 
 
In particular, Islamic banks are already serving 38 million 
customers globally, two-thirds of who reside in seven countries, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Indonesia, and 
Turkey. One-fifth of the banking system assets across these 
countries have now transitioned to Islamic. In Saudi Arabia, 
supply push has seen share of Islamic banking cross 50percent 
of system assets. 
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The global market for Islamic financial services, as measured by 
shari‘a  compliant assets, is estimated by TheCityUK to have 
increased in 2013, to a record $1,688bn (Chart 1). The industry 
is set to grow significantly in the years ahead. At the current rate 
of growth the market could top $2 trillion in assets by the end of 
2014. The largest centres remain concentrated in Malaysia and 
the Middle East, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait 
(Chart 2). 
 
Islamic finance has shown resilience at a time when the global 
economy has slowed and conventional banking in Western 
countries has been under pressure. Global assets of Islamic 
finance have doubled since the start of the economic slowdown. 
Considerable potential exists for expansion of Islamic finance.  
The Muslim population numbering some 1.6 billion accounts for 
nearly a quarter of the global population, but Sharia compliant 
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assets make up only around 1percent of the world’s financial 
assets. Less than a fifth of Muslims worldwide currently use 
Islamic financial products. The extent of the industry’s 
penetration varies substantially 
 
There are over 700 institutions registered globally as sharia-
compliant organisations in financial services. Of these, around 
500 are full-fledged standalone institutions, and the remainder 
operate sharia-compliant products within a conventional 
institution or known as Islamic windows. Countries with most of 
the 430 firms reporting to The Banker’s survey include Bahrain 
and Indonesia with 74 and 71 firms respectively. Malaysia, Iran, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were in a group of countries with more 
than 50 firms.  
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III. Corporate governance in Islamic Finance: basic concepts 
and issues 
 
D. Definition of corporate governance 
 
The agency problem arises because of the relationship between 
the owners and the management. The scandal in corporate 
governance made the scholars defining corporate governance 
based on the problem solving perspective or corporate affairs 
perspective. In addition, most definition states that internal 
governance mechanism involves board of directors and 
ownership structure while external involves to take over market 
and legal system. 
 
The governments of the 30 OECD countries have approved a 
revised version of the OECD's Principles of Corporate 
Governance adding new recommendations for good practice in 
corporate behaviour with a view to rebuilding and maintaining 
public trust in companies and stock markets. 
 
The revised Principles respond to a number of issues that have 
undermined the confidence of investors in company 
management in recent years. They call on governments to 
ensure genuinely effective regulatory frameworks and on 
companies themselves to be truly accountable. They advocate 
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an increased awareness among institutional investors and an 
effective role for shareholders in executive compensation. They 
also urge strengthened transparency and disclosure to counter 
conflicts of interest. 
 
Corporate governance aims at providing institutions with a body 
of rules and principles, with a view to ensuring that good 
practices guide overall management of an institution. It has now 
come to mean the whole process of managing a company and 
the incentive structure to address principal-agent issues and 
ensure that executive management serves the long-term best 
interests of the shareholders and sustainable value of the 
company in conformity with the laws and ethics of the country. 
All of the complex factors that are involved in balancing the 
power between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the board, 
and the shareholders are now considered to be a part of the 
corporate governance framework, including auditing, balance 
sheet and off-balance disclosure, and transparency.  
Hence, corporate governance refers to the method by which a 
corporation is directed, administered and controlled. It includes 
the laws and customs affecting that direction, as well as the 
goals for which it is governed. Corporate governance 
mechanisms, incentives and controls are designed to reduce the 
inefficiencies that arise from moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Corporate governance is also viewed as a process of 
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monitoring performance by applying appropriate counter-
measures and dealing with transparency, integrity and 
accountability. It organizes the way corporations are 
accountable to shareholders and the public, and also the 
monitoring of the executive management of organisations in 
running their businesses.   
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first published 
in 1999, have been widely adopted as a benchmark both in 
OECD countries and elsewhere. They are used as one of 12 key 
standards by the Financial Stability Forum for ensuring 
international financial stability and by the World Bank in its work 
to improve corporate governance in emerging markets.  
 
In 2002, OECD governments called for a review of the Principles 
to take account of developments in the corporate sector. The 
revised text is the product of a consultation process involving 
representatives of both OECD and non-OECD governments as 
well as of businesses and professional bodies, trade unions, civil 
society organisations and international standard-setting bodies. 
The OECD began a review of the principles in 2003 considering 
the recent changes and developments and after an extensive 
review the process led to adopt revised and reviewed OECD 
principles of corporate governance in April, 2004. The revision 
principles not only reflect the experience of OECD countries but 
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also the emerging and developing economics. The revised 
principles are non-binding in nature and it lays up to the 
governments and market 
participants to decide for their own framework. It also confirmed 
the adaptability of the principles as a reference in varying legal, 
economic and cultural contexts. “Corporate governance is the 
system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled . The corporate governance specifies the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders, and spell out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structures through which the company objectives 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance”. The following are the main areas of 
the OECD principles and its annotation: 
Principle 1: Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate 
governance framework. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with 
the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of 
responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
Principle 2: The right of shareholders and key ownership 
functions. 
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Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
Principle 3: The equitable treatment of shareholders. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have 
the opportunities to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. 
Principle 4: The role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
recognize the rights of stakeholders established by lawor 
through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, 
and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. 
Principle 5: Disclosure and transparency. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, including the 
financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of 
the company. 
Principle 6: The responsibilities of the board. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
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The main theme of the above principle lies in four basic 
principles. Firstly, the mechanism of business ethics, secondly 
the mechanism of decision making, thirdly in adequate 
disclosure and transparency and lastly the mechanism of book 
keeping and final accounts. These OECD principles are so 
sound that even the non-members of OECD are implementing 
and adopting. 
The soundness of these principles has been proved by its 
adoption all over the world the next section will discuss the 
Islamic view of corporate government from the Islamic 
perspective. 
 
Researchers have defined corporate governance in a variety of 
ways, and the most widely cited definitions follow. The OECD 
defines CG as “a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate Governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined”. This definition provides important attributes of 
CG and emphasizes transparency. However, it does not directly 
deal with the intrinsic issue of the business objectives that 
should guide the distribution of rights and responsibilities within 
the corporation. Indeed, the objectives of a corporation’s 
founders’, whether these be the increase of shareholders’ value 
72 
 
or the pursuit of stakeholders’ interest, can be expected to affect 
such a distribution and shape the institutional structure and 
systems. In particular,the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among shareholders and other stakeholders 
would be driven by the interests of whoever establishes the 
corporation and subsequently controls it. 
 
 
The revised Principles emphasise the importance of a regulatory 
framework in corporate governance that promotes efficient 
markets, facilitates effective enforcement and clearly defines the 
responsibilities between different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities.  They also emphasise the need to 
ensure transparent lines of management responsibility within 
companies so as to make boards and management truly 
accountable.  
Other issues addressed by the revised Principles include:  
 
Institutional investors  
• They should disclose their corporate governance policies, 
how they decide on the use of their voting rights and how 
they manage conflicts of interest that may compromise 
their voting; 
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• Restrictions on consultations between shareholders about 
their voting intentions should be eased to reduce the cost 
of informed ownership. 
    
 Shareholder rights 
• The rights of investors must be strengthened. 
Shareholders should be able to remove board members 
and participate effectively in the nomination and election 
processes; 
• They should be able to make their views known about 
executive and board remuneration policy and any equity 
component should be subject to their approval. 
 
Conflicts of interest and auditor responsibility 
• A new principle calls for rating agencies and analysts to 
avoid conflicts of interest which could compromise their 
advice; 
• The duties of the auditor must be strengthened and 
include accountability to shareholders and a duty to the 
company to exercise due professional care when 
conducting an audit; 
• Auditors should be wholly independent and not be 
compromised by other relations with the company.   
 
Stakeholder rights and whistle-blower protection 
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• The Principles make reference to the rights of 
stakeholders, whether established by law or through 
mutual agreements. 
• A new principle advocates protection for whistleblowers, 
including institutions through which their complaints or 
allegations can be addressed and provides for confidential 
access to a board member.  
 
Board responsibilities 
• The duties and responsibilities of the board have been 
clarified as fiduciary in nature, particularly important where 
company groups are concerned; 
• The principle covering board independence and objectivity 
has been extended to avoid conflicts of interest and to 
cover situations characterised by block and controlling 
shareholders, as well as the board's responsibility for 
oversight of internal control systems covering financial 
reporting. 
A concept of corporate governance from Islamic perspective 
does not differ much with the conventional definition as it refers 
to a system by which companies are directed and controlled with 
a purpose to meet the corporation’s objective by protecting all 
the stakeholders’ interest and right. Uniquely, in the context of 
corporate governance within the Islamic paradigm it presents 
distinct characteristics and features in comparison with the 
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conventional system as it refers as a special case of a broader 
decision-making theory that uses the premise of Islamic socio-
scientific epistemology which is premised on the divine 
oneness of God . A definition by the finance committee on 
corporate governance in Malaysia in the report on corporate 
governance stated that: 
Corporate governance is the process and structure used to 
direct and manage the business and affairs of the company 
towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term 
shareholder value, whilst taking account the interests of other 
stakeholders. 
This indicates that corporate governance is not only applied to 
the shareholders but the other stakeholders as well. 
Corporate governance in Islamic finance necessitates Islamic 
financial institutions abiding by a set of rules called the Islamic 
law or Shari’a. The Shari’a governs the bank’s operations and 
transactions in accordance with Islamic principles derived from 
the Quran and Hadith. 
 
 
Regulatory and Corporate Governance (CG) framework of Banks  
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I. National CG Framework  
- Banking Sector Specific Laws/Codes/Guidelines  
- Stock Exchanges Listing Rules and Regulations  
- Listed Companies Regulatory Authorities Laws, Rules and Regulations  
 
II. Islamic Finance and Shari’a specific Codes & Standards  
- IFSB Guiding Principles on Shari’a Governance systems for Institutions Offering Islamic 
Financial Services 2009  
- IFSB Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial 
Services 2009  
- IFSB Guiding Principles On Corporate Governance For Institutions Offering Only Islamic 
Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions And Islamic Mutual Funds) 
2006  
- IFSB Guidance on Key Elements in the Supervisory Review Process of Institutions offering 
Islamic Financial Services (excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual 
Funds) 2007  
- AAOIFI Accounting, Auditing & Governance Standards (for Islamic financial institutions)  
 
III. International Standards and Codes  
- The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance  
- Guidance by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on Enhancing Corporate Governance 
for Banking Organisations 2006  
 
The above framework  suggests the build-up of a corporate 
governance framework for IFIs. To ensure that a national or 
sector specific CG framework is consistent with international 
best practice, the framework should incorporate the OECD 
principles and the BIS Guidelines. 
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Comparison of Islamic Corporate Governance Principles with OECD principles 
An attempt is made to bring a comparative position of Islamic principles of corporate 
governance with the revised principles of OECD. 
 
Principle number OECD principles and annotation Islamic principles 
Insuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
• Promotion of transparent 
and 
1 efficient markets with rule 
of law and division of 
responsibilities 
• Promotion of business within 
ethical framework of 
Shariah 
• Believes in profit and loss 
• Primacy of Justice and social 
welfare with social and spiritual 
obligations 
• Prohibition of interest 
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Principle number OECD principles and annotation Islamic principles 
The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
• Basic shareholder rights • Property as trust from God 
2 • Participation in Decision-
making at the general 
meetings 
• Structures and arrangements 
markets for corporate control 
• Ownership rights by all 
shareholders including 
institutional shareholders 
• Consultative process 
between shareholders 
and institutional 
shareholders 
The equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
• Protection to minority and 
foreign 
3 
shareholders 
• Sole Authority is God 
 
• Society as stakeholders 
 
• Accountability not only to 
stakeholders but also to God, the 
ultimate owner 
 
 
 
 
• Just and fairness of value 
 
• Equitable distribution of wealth 
to all stakeholders and 
disadvantages members in the 
form of Zakat and Sadqa 
• Social and individual welfare 
with both spiritual and moral 
obligation 
• Sensation of Equality 
The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
• In creating wealth, jobs 
and 
4 
sustainability of 
financially sound 
enterprises 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
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• Islamic accountability to Falah and 
social welfare orientation 
 
• Haram/Halal dichotomy in transaction 
• Social & individual welfare 
from both spiritual and 
material 
• Consideration to whole community. 
• Matters regarding corporation • Accountability with Shariah compliance 
5 
• Financial situation • Socio-economic objectives 
related to firms’ control and 
accountability to all its 
stakeholders 
• Performance, 
ownership and 
governance 
 
 
The responsibilities of the 
board 
• Justice, equality, truthfulness 
transparency 
 
• Wider accountability with 
written as well as oral disclosure 
• Strategic guidance • Accountability not only to company or 
6 
board or stakeholders but also to Allah 
the 
ultimate authority who leads to 
welfare and success 
• Monitoring of management • Holistic and integrative guidance 
• Accountability to 
company and 
stakeholders 
• Negotiation and co-operation 
 
• Consultation and consensus 
seeking for each decision with 
related stakeholders 
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E. Corporate governance system around the world 
1. Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system 
The Anglo-Saxon system is taking by the main source of firm’s finance. 
Therefore, the main concentration of Anglo-Saxon  corporate 
governance  is the shareholder interest where the principle is applied by 
given the right to each shareholder to vote pursuant to that the law found 
to be protecting the shareholder against the management where a 
shareholder can be found misusing the company money which might 
affect the shareholder  wealth. 
The composition of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system is 
one board of directors constituting of executives and non-executives. 
The executive directors are managers of the corporations; whereas the 
non-executive directors are representing the shareholders to monitor the 
manager in their day to day business. Both executive and non-executives 
directors’ members are appointed and dismissed by general assembly 
of shareholders . 
 
2. Germanic corporate governance system 
The Germanic corporate governance system deals with the firm as an 
autonomous economic entity which may benefit to shareholders and 
stakeholders in the firm. Countries which implement this system use two 
board system consisting of a supervisory board and managing board. 
Supervisory board main duties are to appoint the managing dismiss 
managing board and to evaluate management performance. Germanic 
corporate governance system considers the bank as the main source of 
finance. Therefore, the bank 
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has a significant voting right in shareholder’s assembly and also 
represents shareholders’ interest in a supervisory board. 
 
3. Latin corporate governance system 
The Latin corporate governance system is considered more flexible 
compared with previous systems. In a context of board of directors, Latin 
corporations have an option to select either one board as Anglo-Saxon 
system or two boards as in Germanic system, shareholders have more 
influence in the Latin system, i.e. in French legislation, shareholders can 
remove a director, which overrule on a share one vote system. 
 
4. Japanese corporate governance system 
The board of directors in Japanese system comprises a board of 
directors, an office of representative directors and an office of auditors. 
The president is the rarely the chairman of the board. Banks have high 
influence on the decision making of the management in the Japanese 
system. 
 
F. Shariah Governance in Islamic Finance 
Islamic financial institutions have the duty to ensure the compliance with 
shari‘a  principles in all aspects of their products, instruments, 
operations, practices and management which will be achieved by the 
establishment of a proper shari‘a  governance framework. Thus shari‘a  
supervision plays an essential role in the governance of Islamic financial 
institution and forms part of the principal component of the shari‘a  
governance framework. One of the roles of the shari‘a  supervisory board 
is to advise the Islamic financial instutions on shari‘a  matters to ensure 
conformity with shari‘a  rule in its operations at all time, endorsing and 
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validating relevant documentations pertaining to the products and 
services of the Islamic financial institutions. The ideal role of shari‘a  
supervision involve ex ante and ex post aspects of shari‘a  governance 
and these include shari‘a  pronouncement, supervision and review.  
In this aspect, the Sharia governance framework in Malaysia is based on 
the centralised model as compared to the decentralized being practiced 
in the GCC countries.The centralized model is formed on the basis that 
the Central Bank itself has its own shari‘a  supervisory board called the 
shari‘a  Advisory Board by virtue of section 51 of the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 2009 and all Islamic financial institutions are required to 
form their own shari‘a  committee which must comply with the rules set 
by the shari‘a  Advisory Board of the Central Bank. The importance of 
shari‘a  supervision is derived from five different resources namely 
religious, social,economic, legal and governance. The religious position 
is derived from the ability of shari‘a  scholars in understanding and 
interpreting shari‘a  principles to others. The social power of the shari‘a  
supervision provides confidence to the stakeholders about the legitimacy 
of the transactions and activities of the Islamic financial institutions. The 
economic power of the shari‘a  supervision can be seen from the fact 
that the profitability of an Islamic financial institution is dependent on the 
performance of shari‘a  scholars. As far as legal power is concerned it is 
derived from a variety of sources including regulators of the respective 
countries. The hierarchical position of shari‘a  supervision under the 
shareholders of the Islamic financial institutions emphasizes it 
supremacy over other governance organs thus giving them authority to 
set their internal policy including task,responsibilities and relations with 
other governance organs in the Islamic financial institutions.  
83 
 
The shari‘a  governance which refers to all the elements about the active 
role of the shari‘a  board and compliance with shari‘a  is fundamental to 
Islamic banks in particular and the implementation of shari‘a  governance 
is encouraged by international institutions of regulations like Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) and 
Islamic Financial Services BoardShariah board monitoring 
The SSB plays very important role in ensuring good shari‘a  governance. 
The role of the SSB is to include advising board of directors on shari‘a  
matters to ensure that the operations comply with shari‘a  principles at 
all time, endorsing and validating relevant documentations pertaining to 
the products and services, as well as the internal policies and manuals 
and marketing advertisements. 
Dynamic and good shari‘a  governance is the very essence in the 
development of Islamic banking and finance sector in Malaysia. Good 
shari‘a  governance guarantees the dynamicity of Islamic financial 
growth. 
The interest of stakeholders may extend beyond the financial interest to 
ethical, religious or other values when requiring good corporate 
governance. In Islamic banks shareholders and Islamic scholars requires 
the operation of services offered to be under shari‘a  law otherwise it will 
be subject to process in no permission. Therefore, corporate governance 
through shari‘a  operation is essential. 
Each Islamic bank or financial institution has in-house religious advisers, 
collectively known as SSB, as part of the internal governance structure 
of the institution, in some countries, authorities have created oversight 
arrangement, such as shari‘a  board in Islamic banking departments 
within supervisory agencies. These usually operate in connection with 
private independent market agents familiar with Islamic finance. 
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SSB prerogatives lie in five main areas: certification of permissible 
financial instruments though fatwas (ex  ante shari‘a  audit), verification 
of transactions’ compliance with issued fatwa (ex post shari‘a  audit) the 
calculation and payment of Zakat, disposal of non shari‘a  payment 
compliant earning, advise to the distribution of income or expenses 
among the bank shareholders and investment account holders. Each 
SBB issues a report to certify the shari‘a  compliance of all financial 
transactions. In addition to SSB, most Islamic financial institutions have 
established another internal shari‘a  Review structure namely shari‘a  
Review units. These units are independent of other departments or are 
an integral part of the internal audit and control department. 
In recent years, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has 
developed three Guiding Principles to help strengthen governance 
structures and processes in various segments of the Islamic financial 
services industry (IFSI) in line with its mandate to promote soundness 
and stability of the Islamic financial system.It was noted that in all three 
projects, concerns over the roles and functions of the Shari`ah boards, 
which constitute part of the broader governance system, have been a 
recurring theme. This is crucial,considering that compliance with 
Shari`ah rules and principles is the raison d'être of the IFSI. In fact, other 
IFSB standards – such as those on risk management, capital adequacy 
and supervisory review process – also contain requirements and 
recommendations aimed at ensuring that an appropriate Shari`ah 
governance system is in place. 
Consequently, the IFSB Council, during its ninth meeting in Jeddah, 
approved the preparation of a set of Guiding Principles on the Shari`ah 
governance system, which is expected to: 
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(a) complement other prudential standards issued by the IFSB by 
highlighting in more detail to the supervisory authorities in particular, and 
the industry’s other stakeholders in general, the components of a sound 
Shari`ah governance system, especially with regard to the competence, 
independence, confidentiality and consistency of Shari`ah boards; 
(b) facilitate better understanding of Shari`ah governance issues and 
how stakeholders should satisfy themselves that an appropriate and 
effective Shari`ah governance system is in place; 
(c) provide an enhanced degree of transparency in terms of issuance, 
and the audit/review process for compliance with Shari`ah rulings; and 
(d) provide greater harmonisation of the Shari`ah governance structures 
and procedures across jurisdictions, especially since there are 
increasing numbers of IIFS with cross-border operations. 
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G. Definition and Scope of Shari'a Governance System 
 
The term “Shari'a Governance System”, despite being commonly used 
within the IFSI to refer to structures and processes adopted by 
stakeholders in the IFSI (from financial regulators to market players) to 
ensure compliance with Shari'a rules and principles, has not been 
properly defined in any of the existing standards. In the interests of 
clarity, this document shall adopt the following definition of “Shari'a 
Governance System” and the other key terminology: 
“Shari'a Governance System” refers to the set of institutional and 
organisational arrangements through which an IIFS ensures that there is 
effective independent oversight of Shari'a compliance over each of the 
following structures and processes: 
(a) Issuance of relevant Shari'a pronouncements/resolutions “Shari'a 
pronouncements/resolutions” refers to a juristic opinion on any matter 
pertaining to Shari`ah issues in Islamic finance, given by the 
appropriately mandated Shari`ah board. In jurisdictions where there is a 
central authority such as the national Shari`ah board or Fatwa Council, 
that central authority has the power to issue such 
pronouncements/resolutions, resulting in the Shari`ah board at the IIFS 
usually focusing only on ensuring that the IIFS is compliant with the 
pronouncements/resolutions issued by the central authority.Once it is 
decided that a Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution should actually be 
implemented, it becomes a “Shari`ah ruling” (hukm al-Shar’i) with full 
legal effect that binds the IIFS.A Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution 
shall be issued only through appropriate due processes, which, amongst 
others, should involve rigorous deliberation among members of the 
Shari`ah board over any proposed Shari`ah-compliant products or 
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transactions that require a Shari'a endorsement, as well as detailed 
scrutiny of the legal contracts and other documents relevant to the 
products or transactions. 
(b) Dissemination of information on such shari'a 
pronouncements/resolutions to the operative personnel of the IIFS who 
monitor the day-to-day compliance with the shari'a 
pronouncements/resolutions vis-à-vis every level of operations and each 
transaction Such a task would normally be undertaken by a designated 
“internal Shari`ah compliance unit/department (ISCU)”, or at least a 
Shari`ah compliance officer who is part of the IIFS’s compliance team. 
The IIFS shall equip the ISCU with the appropriate compliance-
monitoring skills and relevant knowledge of the shari'a – for example, by 
assembling a team of staff with the two different skill-sets. The IIFS 
should also ensure that the ISCU is separate and independent from the 
business units and departments. 
(c) An internal Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that 
Shari`ah compliance has been satisfied,during which any incident of 
non-compliance will be recorded and reported, and as far as possible, 
addressed and rectified IFSB-3 sets out that Shari`ah pronouncements/ 
resolutions issued by the Shari`ah boards should be strictly adhered to. 
The internal Shari`ah review would therefore be assigned to someone 
adequately trained in Shari`ah compliance review/audit, so that he or she 
would have a competent grasp of the process. 
While the ISCU is part of the IIFS’s compliance team,the internal 
Shari`ah review/audit unit/department (ISRU) may be established to 
function in a similar manner to the IIFS’s internal audit team. The major 
difference is that while the internal auditor will usually report to the Audit 
Committee, the ISRU shall report to the Shari`ah board. 
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Where appropriate, the internal Shari`ah review/audit reports shall 
require or recommend the management of the IIFS to address and rectify 
any issues of Shari`ah compliance. 
(d) An annual Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that the 
internal Shari`ah compliance review/audit has been appropriately carried 
out and its findings have been duly noted by the Shari`ah board The 
Shari`ah board who issued the Shari`ah pronouncements/resolutions 
can take charge of this process, having received feedback and reports 
from the ISRU. Alternatively, this task may be assigned to an 
appropriately competent external auditor or external shari'a firm. 
The shari'a board or shari'a advisory firm that carries out the shari'a 
compliance review/audit shall produce reports, indicating whether the 
IIFS has complied with shari'a requirements throughout the financial 
year. 
Where appropriate and if deemed necessary, there could be two sets of 
reports produced: a general statement of compliance that should be 
included in the annual report of the IIFS; and a more detailed account of 
compliance work undertaken addressed specifically to 
the supervisory authorities. 
 
H.  shari‘a  Governance Model from Regulatory 
Perspective 
 
 shari‘a  governance system as defined by The IFSB Guiding Principles 
on Sharia Governance System in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial 
Services (IFSB-10) refers to a set of institutional and organizational 
arrangements to oversee  shari‘a  compliance aspects in Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFIs). In this regard, majority of IFIs have 
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established their own  shari‘a  board and some of them even have set up 
a dedicated internal  shari‘a  review unit or department to support  shari‘a  
board in performing its function. This indicates a positive development 
on the aspect of  shari‘a  governance system in IFIs. Looking at the 
different framework and style of  shari‘a  governance in various legal 
environment and diverse banking models. 
 
The existing framework of Islamic finance in various jurisdictions 
demonstrates diverse practices and models of  shari‘a  governance 
system. Some jurisdictions prefer greater 
 
involvement of regulatory authorities and some countries on the other 
hand favor otherwise. Until now, it is still debatable whether the 
former or the latter is more prevalent and appropriate for possible 
adoption. To illustrate these diverse approaches, this study identifies 
five  shari‘a  governance models in the context of regulatory 
perspective. 
 
1. Reactive Approach 
This model is more prevalent in non-Islamic legal environment 
countries such as United Kingdom and Turkey. Although several 
Islamic banking licenses have been issued to IFIs, the regulatory 
authority is silent upon the  shari‘a  governance framework. Like any 
other conventional banks, IFIs are required to comply with existing 
legislations and regulations. On top of that, IFIs have duty to make 
sure that all their business operation and products are  shari‘a  
compliant. There is no specific legislation governing IFIs as well as 
any directive specifying  shari‘a  governance framework. At this point, 
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the regulators will only react and intervene the  shari‘a  governance 
matters if there is any significance issue involved which may affect 
the industry. For instance, the UK Financial Services Authority only 
concerns on the roles play by the  shari‘a  board of IFIs to be advisory 
and supervisory and not executive in nature. 
 
2. Passive Approach 
This model is exclusive to  shari‘a  governance model in Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Authority Monetary Agency (SAMA) treats IFIs equal 
to their conventional counterparts. SAMA has yet to issue legislation 
pertaining to Islamic finance and guidelines on  shari‘a  governance 
system. There is no national  shari‘a  advisory board or any 
institutions to be the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. The 
existing  shari‘a  governance system as practiced by IFIs in the 
Kingdom is a product of self initiative rather than regulatory 
requirement or regulator’s direction. 
 
3. Minimalist Approach 
This model is mainly practiced by the GCC countries with the 
exception of Oman and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the reactive approach, 
the minimalist model allows slight intervention on the part of 
regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities expect IFIs to have 
proper  shari‘a  governance system without specifying the 
requirements in details. There is no restriction on multiple 
appointments of the  shari‘a  board to seat in various institutions at 
one particular time. Some jurisdictions in the GCC countries such as 
Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar favor the adoption of the AAOIFI 
Governance Standards. The minimalist approach prefers the market 
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to develop its own  shari‘a  governance system rather than greater 
intervention on the part of regulators. 
4. Pro-Active Approach 
This model is favorable by Malaysian regulatory authority. The 
proponent of this model has strong faith in regulatory-based approach 
in strengthening  shari‘a  governance framework. With this 
motivation, Malaysian regulator initiates comprehensive  shari‘a  
governance framework from regulatory and non-regulatory aspects. 
There are several laws were passed and amended by the parliament 
such as the Islamic Banking Act 1983, the Takaful Act 1984, the 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1984 and the Securities 
Commission Act 1993. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
confirms the status of National  shari‘a  Advisory Council (SAC) to be 
the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. Furthermore, the Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) has issued the Guidelines on the 
Governance of  shari‘a  Committee for the Islamic Financial 
Institutions known as the BNM/GPS1. To complement this, the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia issued the Registration of  shari‘a  
Advisers Guidelines 2009 which setting up the criteria for the 
registration of a  shari‘a  adviser in the capital market sector. 
 
5. Interventionist Approach. 
While passive approach is exclusive to Saudi Arabia, 
interventionist model is unique to  shari‘a  governance model in 
Pakistan. The interventionist model allows third party institution to 
make decision on  shari‘a  matters pertaining to Islamic finance. In 
the case of Pakistan, the  shari‘a  Federal Court is the highest 
authority in matters involving Islamic finance despite of the 
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establishment of  shari‘a  board at the State Bank of Pakistan level. 
 
 
Shareholders increasingly expect companies to adhere to strict 
standards of corporate governance. In essence, corporate governance 
is the system by which companies are directed and controlled and 
involves adopting structures and processes which incorporate the values 
of fairness, transparency and accountability. The practical objective of 
corporate governance is to put in place a system which will deliver a 
company’s business objectives, i.e. increasing shareholder value, whilst 
managing risk. Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) share the same 
practical and business objectives, but are subject to an additional layer 
of compliance with shari‘a  rules and principles. An IFI does not only seek 
to make a profit, it seeks to make such profit in a socially responsible 
manner.  
The IFSB has recently released a number of exposure drafts providing 
‘Guiding Principles’ specifically aimed at Islamic financial institutions. 
The aim is not thereby to establish an entirely new governance 
framework for the Islamic finance industry, but rather to build on and 
complement existing international standards and encourage institutions 
to view compliance as part of a general strengthening of good corporate 
governance culture. 
Principles of good business conduct are desirable in terms of protecting 
investor interests and enhancing the integrity of the institutions 
concerned. It is also a requirement under shari‘a  that companies 
observe principles of ethical business conduct. Furthermore, the 
principles of certainty and transparency underpin the validity of a shari‘a  
compliant contract. 
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Three recent exposure drafts, published in December 2008, offer 
‘Guiding Principles’ on Conduct of Business for Institutions offering only 
Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds) (the Guiding Principles on 
Conduct of Business), shari‘a  Governance System and Governance for 
Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Operations (the exposure drafts). These 
exposure drafts build on existing corporate governance and other IFSB 
standards. This briefing focuses on the first two. 
The Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business adopt a principles-based 
rather than a purely rules-based approach. It is intended that the seven 
principles outlined in the exposure draft will form the basis of a code of 
business conduct which is observed by all IFIs, and which complements 
existing standards. 
Principle 1 
Honesty and Fairness - IFIs should treat all shareholders fairly and aspire 
to the highest standards of honesty and integrity in all their dealings with 
them. 
Principle 2 
Due Care and Diligence - IFIs should exercise due care, skill and 
diligence in their dealings with all categories of investors. An IFI will be 
expected to carry out proper evaluations of risk in relation to any 
investment activity and undertake appropriate reviews of the process of 
obtaining shari‘a  approval and of the shari‘a  compliance of asset 
portfolios. 
Principle 3 
Capabilities - an IFI must ensure that its senior management, staff and 
representatives are capable of discharging their duties competently. In 
particular, it is expected that those parties will have an appropriate 
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understanding of shari‘a  and this principle must be continually kept 
under review. 
Principle 4 
Information about Clients - an IFI must undertake “know your customer” 
checks to ensure that an investor’s business and the purpose of any 
financing are consistent with shari‘a  rules and principles. 
Principle 5 
Information to Clients - reporting processes must be transparent and fair. 
An IFI must protect investors and potential investors by providing them 
with information that appropriately reflects the nature of its products and 
services, and the associated risks. 
Principle 6 
Conflicts of Interest and Duty - as far as possible, an IFI should avoid 
situations which create a conflict of interest. Where this cannot be 
avoided, the situation should be managed to ensure that all stakeholders 
are treated fairly and any issues are addressed in a transparent and open 
manner. 
Principle 7 
Shariah Compliance - an IFI must adopt and implement appropriate 
shari‘a  governance systems in order to monitor its shari‘a  compliance. 
Since shari‘a  compliance is of paramount importance in the context of 
IFIs, this issue is addressed more fully in a separate exposure draft as 
set out below. 
 
Previous IFSB publications highlighted a particular concern over the role 
and function of shari‘a  boards within the Islamic financial services 
industry. shari‘a  boards play a key role in advising institutions on their 
compliance with shari‘a  rules and principles. Whilst other IFSB 
95 
 
publications have contained recommendations for ensuring appropriate 
shari‘a  governance systems are in place, the Guiding Principles on 
shari‘a  Governance System were a response to the industry’s need for 
greater clarity in this fundamental area. 
‘Shariah Governance’ is defined as the set of institutional and 
organisational arrangements through which an IFI ensures that there is 
effective independent supervision of, in particular, the issue and 
dissemination of shari‘a  pronouncements, and internal and external 
shari‘a  compliance reviews. 
Principle 1 
General Approach - various different shari‘a  governance structures have 
been adopted in different jurisdictions, and systems adopted should be 
proportionate to the size, complexity and nature of the business. shari‘a  
boards should have a clear mandate and be equipped with operative 
procedures and reporting lines to provide effective shari‘a  governance. 
Principle 2 
Competence - the choice of the scholars and other individuals whose 
role is to provide shari‘a  advice should be made on the basis of an 
individual’s honesty, good character and possession of the necessary 
qualifications to understand the technical requirements of the business. 
The need for ongoing professional development of such individuals is 
also crucial to ensure that they are kept up-to-date with legislative 
changes and industry-specific knowledge. shari‘a  boards should be 
regularly assessed in relation to objective performance criteria and be 
accountable to the board of directors. 
Principle 3 
Independence - no individual member of a shari‘a  board should be 
‘connected’ with the company or serve another function within the 
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company. Each member should be capable of exercising independent 
judgement. The management of the IFI should ensure that all relevant 
information is supplied to the shari‘a  board promptly and in such a 
manner that enables the board to discharge its duties properly. This will 
involve allowing the shari‘a  board independent access to senior 
management and providing for any further enquiries that may be made. 
Principle 4 
Confidentiality - members of the shari‘a  board will inevitably be exposed 
to commercially sensitive inside information in the discharge of their 
duties. As part of an IFI’s broader risk management processes therefore, 
it should ensure that adequate confidentiality clauses are included in 
each member’s service contract. There should also be an appropriate 
procedure for dealing with leaks of inside information, which may include 
some form of disciplinary action. 
Principle 5 
Consistency - decisions of shari‘a  boards should be consistent and, as 
far as possible, follow the pronouncements of the central shari‘a  
authority in the relevant jurisdiction, where applicable. Where no such 
authority exists, it is recommended that the shari‘a  board uses best 
efforts to conform to any previous rulings and to publish its decisions so 
that they may be openly and transparently assessed. 
The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
The rule relating to shari‘a  governance is provided under section 30 until 
section 36 of IFSA 2013 whereby the existence of these provisions 
highlighted the intention of the law maker, in focusing to the matters 
pertaining to appointment and qualification of the shari‘a  Committees 
members in Islamic financial institution. Unlike the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 2009 which merely touched the surface of the matter by 
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highlighting the general requirement for financial institution to have a 
shari‘a  committee, the current provision provides a more specific 
requirement under section 30 of IFSA 2013 which requires an institution 
to apply directly to the Central Bank for the establishment of shari‘a  
Committee. This will enable the Central Bank to have direct information 
as to the members of the shari‘a  Committee in an Islamic financial 
institution, which at the same time, to ensure a proper supervision 
towards the activities conducted. 
Another major point being made available under the new shari‘a  
governance legal provision is the criteria of the members of shari‘a  
Committee. A clear standard of requirement pertaining to the 
appointment of such committee is highlighted under section 31 which is 
to be crossed referred with section section 29 (2) (a) which states only 
those who is really fit and qualified may be appointed as the shari‘a  
Committee members. This leads to the notion that members of shari‘a  
Committees in every financial institution must be chaired by those who 
met the requirements as stated by the Central Bank. 
Availability of such clause would be vital in ensuring the products and 
services introduced by the Islamic financial institution complied with the 
shari‘a  principles via the supervision of competent members. 
Section 32 of IFSA 2013 contributes to the significance of shari‘a  
Committees in every institution through the introduction of the shari‘a  
governance which not only set out the duties of the shari‘a  committees 
in the institution, but rather blend into the structure of the company itself. 
By extending the powers of shari‘a  governance into certain aspects in a 
company such as matters involving the board of directors and internal 
shari‘a  compliance, we can understand that shari‘a  governance would 
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be one of the integral parts in an institution up to the point that shari‘a  
comittee may no longer be treated as a minor part or division of a 
company, what more against the idea of abandoning such 
governance rules. 
The introduction of under section 33 and 34 of IFSA, on the other hand, 
enables the Central Bank to continuously be updated by the institution of 
its shari‘a  Committee members. In order to maintain its aim of ensuring 
that only those who really qualifies entitled to be the members, the 
provision set out the clause relating to the cessation of the members 
including situations which would disqualifies from becoming shari‘a  
committee members. 
By setting out a more precise rules and features of the shari‘a  committee 
members, the IFSA 2013 under section 35 has made it compulsory for 
management in charge of the company to provide information to the 
shari‘a  committee in exercising its task and duties. While the Act did not 
mention the type and degree of information required, it can be assumed 
that the shari‘a  Committee is authorised to obtain regardless of any kind, 
if such information would assist them in carrying out their duties. 
In addition, section 36 marks the trust which has been given by the 
legislation over the  shari‘a  Committee to hold any type of information 
including the confidential ones provided such information is not being 
relayed to the other persons. While maintaining the duty of 
confidentiality, the  shari‘a  committees are also vested with the 
protection under the qualified privilege which prevents them from being 
taken a legal action by the Islamic financial institution, if it can be proven 
that such duties was conducted in good faith. 
The provision clauses as to the  shari‘a  governance is one of the major 
features being introduced under the IFSA 2013 which contributes to the 
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boost of authorities as well as roles of the  shari‘a  Committee,thus 
ensuring the activities of the Islamic financial institution to be under  
shari‘a  compliance thus maintaining a sound and robust  shari‘a  
governance framework in Islamic financial industry in Malaysia. 
 
IV. EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Corporate governance has gained great prominence over the last two 
decades even in the conventional financial system because of continued 
financial instability. It would be of even greater importance in the Islamic 
system because of the additional risk to which the depositors would get 
exposed when the banks really start moving into the risk-sharing modes. 
This poses an important challenge before Islamic banks to improve all 
crucial aspects of corporate governance. The challenge will become 
more serious as these institutions expand and their problems become 
more complex. This challenge could be successfully met if the Board of 
Directors and Senior Management become more effective in the 
performance of their responsibilities. 
 
For this purpose, it is important to sharpen the tools of corporate 
governance, the most important of which are: internal controls, risk 
management, transparency, loan accounting and disclosure, shari‘a 
clearance and audit, external audit, and prudential regulation and 
supervision. Total reliance on these would, however, not be sufficient. 
Moral commitment on the part of all market operators is indispensable. 
Without such commitment, market operators will find different ways of 
violating the law without getting detected and punished. This will create 
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the need for more and more legal checks and controls, which will raise 
transactions costs to an unbearably high level. Making them truly 
accountable before shareholders and depositors by the adoption of 
measures discussed in this paper should also be of great help. What is 
also needed is the establishment of a number of shared institutions as 
discussed above. Without such institutions even banks with the best 
corporate governance may not be able to avoid crises. 
  
However, corporate governance is generally weak in all countries and 
particularly so in developing countries, in which category nearly all 
Muslim countries fall at present. This is because all the institutions that 
play a crucial role in disciplining markets and ensuring efficiency and 
integrity are not well-developed in these countries. Information 
asymmetries are more severe, market participants less experienced, and 
regulations, even if they exist, do not always get enforced effectively and 
impartially because of political corruption and the general weakness of 
judicial systems. Disclosures are also not adequate and accounting 
practices are not well developed. The adverse effects of ineffective 
corporate governance can be more serious in the case of financial 
institutions because their leverage is much higher, the number of their 
stakeholders is more extensive, and the systemic risks of their failure are 
far more serious. There is no reason to assume that, even though the 
Islamic financial institutions have done fairly well so far, they have 
necessarily been able to escape the trappings of the prevailing weak 
corporate governance in developing countries. It is, therefore, not 
possible to avoid the taking of all those measures that would help 
improve the functioning of these institutions. The role of the Board of 
Directors and Senior Management is of crucial importance in this 
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respect. It is gratifying to note that almost all Muslim countries are 
presently in the process of implementing the BCBS guidelines. 
 
A. The Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors cannot, however, play this role effectively if its 
members do not have a high degree of moral integrity as well as 
professional competence in banking business. They must be adequately 
aware of the risks and complexities involved in the banking business. In 
an Islamic system, they must have the additional qualification of being 
well-versed in the shari‘a and its objectives and in particular the rationale 
behind the prohibition of interest. They should ensure adequate 
transparency in keeping with the standards laid down by the BCBS, the 
IFSB and the supervisory authority of their own country through a smooth 
flow of relevant information to directors, senior Management, auditors, 
supervisors, shareholders, depositors and the public according to the 
needs of each with a view to ensure a proper check on the affairs of the 
bank. They must establish a strong internal control system, proper 
accounting procedures, effective internal and external audit, efficient risk 
management, and all necessary checks and balances, rules, regulations 
and procedures. 
  
Experience has shown that directors do not necessarily perform their 
roles effectively. There are a number of reasons for this.  One of these 
is that the Board members may not necessarily have the professional 
competence and the moral integrity that are needed to manage the  bank 
efficiently. Another reason is that Board members are not always 
genuinely elected by shareholders and are not necessarily accountable 
before them. Elections do not take place regularly at defined intervals 
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and, even if they do, evidence indicates that shareholders are not 
actively involved in the election or removal of directors.  This enables 
board members to perpetuate themselves and it is generally difficult to 
dislodge them except through takeovers. These are, however, expensive 
and potentially disruptive and, may not, therefore, be a possible remedy 
except in extreme cases. To correct this situation, it is necessary to have 
a transparent procedure for elections and to adopt measures that would 
enable minority shareholders and investment depositors to have a say in 
Board decisions. It is also necessary to enable shareholders to remove 
Board members in the event of their performance falling far short of what 
they expect. It is, therefore, imperative to institute reforms in election 
procedures as well as proxy rules to enable shareholders to elect 
competent and conscientious persons to the Board of Directors and to 
prevent them from perpetuating themselves in spite of their poor 
performance.  
 
It is also necessary to develop a legal and regulatory infrastructure to 
protect the rights of not only minority shareholders but also depositors 
(both being outsiders). In a number of countries companies are allowed 
to ask registered shareholders, who are unable to attend general 
meetings, to transfer their votes to the Board of Directors. This further 
strengthens the hands of the Board and enables it to control decisions at 
shareholder meetings. Since the transfer of voting rights often leads to 
far-reaching consequences, which may not always be in the interest of 
all stakeholders, it would be desirable to transfer voting rights to 
shareholder associations, if they exist. If such associations do not exist, 
then voting rights may be transferred to supervisory authorities or to 
specialized chartered firms established in the private sector to protect 
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the interest of stakeholders against a fee as discussed later. All three of 
these institutions would perhaps be better qualified to protect the 
interests of stakeholders.  
 
It would also be helpful if there are an adequate number of non-executive 
directors on the Board. Empirical evidence in the conventional system 
indicates that non-executive directors influence positively a Board’s 
capabilities to evaluate and discipline managers. This is perhaps 
because such directors do not have any management responsibility and 
may not, therefore, have a vested interest in protecting the management. 
They may, therefore, be expected to attach greater weight to the 
interests of minority shareholders and depositors and, thereby, help 
inject equity into the company. If they do not come up to this expectation, 
they would hurt their own reputation in the directors’ labour market. 
Removal of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) caused by poor 
performance is more likely in outsider dominated Boards than in insider 
dominated ones. However, here too there are problems. If the non-
executive directors have not been elected by shareholders but rather 
handpicked by the dominant shareholder or the CEO, they would owe 
their careers to him and would, therefore, ‘lack the information and 
incentives required to provide consistent effective corporate 
governance’.  There will, thus, be conflict of interest, which will create a 
lack of willingness on their part to discipline senior management. 
Moreover, Board meetings may not be frequent and non-executive 
directors may not, therefore, be able to monitor the activities of the 
company effectively and ensure correction, particularly if overt criticism 
of management policies in board meetings is considered to be rude 
Since Islamic banks are generally small compared with their 
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conventional counterparts even in Muslim countries, leave alone the rest 
of the world, the amount of capital held by them is also very small. This 
enables concentration of shares in the hands of a few executive 
directors. The number of non-executive directors who can serve as a 
check on the executive directors is also accordingly small. Since the 
small size as well as the concentration of shareholdings carries the 
potential of leading to undesired consequences for protecting the 
interests of all stakeholders, it is desirable to enlarge the size of banks 
and to institute legal reforms with the objective of reducing concentration, 
diversifying risks, and increasing the ability of these banks to absorb 
losses.  
 
It would also be desirable to introduce some other reforms to make the 
Board of Directors more effective in its functions. One of these, which 
needs to be considered seriously, is to relate the remuneration of Board 
members to their performance in the same way as required in mudaraba 
contracts.  The directors in their capacity as mudaribs (managing 
entrepreneurs) should be compensated for only their actual expenses 
and not be entitled to a fixed management fee or remuneration as they 
do in modern corporations. Their remuneration should be a certain 
percent of the profit earned by the bank, if the bank makes a profit. This 
must be in addition to their normal share in profit like other shareholders 
on the basis of their shareholdings. The percentage share of profits to be 
allocated to the directors for their management services must be clearly 
specified in the Articles of Agreement so that it is well-known to the 
shareholders. If the corporation makes a profit, the directors get the 
specified percent of profit for their services. But if the corporation makes 
a loss, the directors do not, like the mudarib, get a ‘fee’ for their 
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management services, and should share in the losses in proportion to 
their stockholdings. The directors would thus get a reward for their 
services only if they have contributed to profits – the higher the profit, the 
greater their reward. This should prove to be an incentive to them for 
better performance. 
 
B. Senior management 
While the Board of Directors refers to persons who are generally not only 
shareholders themselves but also participate in the governance of the 
bank, senior management refers to the CEO and other senior members 
of the staff who perform management functions but are not necessarily 
shareholders. Modern corporations are in general not managed by their 
owners (shareholders). Instead, professional managers are hired to run 
the business. They are ‘fiduciaries’.1 This creates the principal/agent 
problem and leads to a conflict of interests. It is, therefore, necessary to 
impose restrictions on self-dealing, fraud, excessive compensation in 
different hidden forms, and other malpractices. 
 
One of the most important constraints on management is that key 
positions should not be held by one person (‘four eyes principle’). Since 
the CEO and the Chairman of the Board perform two distinct functions in 
the bank, it would be preferable to have two different persons holding 
these positions so that there is a clear division of responsibilities at the 
top of the bank to ensure independence and balance of power and 
authority. Neither the directors nor the management should be allowed 
to stay on the job if they are no longer competent or qualified to run the 
bank. As argued by Jensen and Ruback, poor managers who resist 
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being replaced   might be the costliest manifestation of the agency 
problem.  
It is the responsibility of the Board of Directors and senior management 
to ensure proper internal controls, and effective management of all risks, 
including credit risk, liquidity risk, interest-rate risk, and operational risks. 
Even though the exposure of most Islamic banks to these risks seems to 
be relatively high, they have been able to manage them fairly well so far. 
Nevertheless, this may not necessarily continue in the future. It is, 
therefore, extremely important to cultivate an effective risk management 
culture in these banks to ensure their competitiveness and survival in a 
world full of uncertainties and crises. This cannot, however, be done 
without the active collaboration of Board of Directors, senior 
management, the shari‘a scholars, and bank supervisors. 
C. Regulatory and Internal Frameworks 
 
 
1. Proactive Approach and Integrated Corporate and Sharī'ah 
Governance 
 
In view of the numerous challenges faced by Islamic finance, it is 
recommended that the industry needs a regulatory-based approach 
framework as explained before. As a prerequisite, Sharī'ah 
governance must be part of the concerns of regulators and 
policymakers. The regulators should proactively monitor the 
implementation of Sharī'ah governance and learn from the experience 
of other jurisdictions in nurturing the Sharī'ah governance framework. 
The principle of ‘one-size-fits-all’ Sharī'ah governance is not 
appropriate as the market and local legal environments are different 
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from one place to another. 
 
In designing the Sharī'ah governance framework, it is a matter 
of necessity to have an integrated corporate and Sharī'ah 
governance framework. These two things must not be 
segregated as they complement each other. In this aspect, the 
principles or guidelines on corporate governance must take into 
account the element of Sharī'ah governance when it involves 
institutions offering Islamic financial services. This is important 
because the stakeholder-oriented model of governance in IFIs 
requires them to protect the rights and interests of all 
stakeholders. 
 
2. Supervision and Enforcement 
 
The regulators should have a comprehensive framework in the 
aspects of supervision and enforcement and these include 
written guidelines on supervision for supervisors, directives for 
IFIs issued by supervisors, sufficient resources with adequate 
knowledge on Sharī'ah governance-related matters  and full  
authority to carry out the enforcement functions. The 
supervisors should provide guidelines and make sure that they 
evaluate the internal policies and procedures as well as the 
implementation of these procedures. It is also important for the 
supervisors to consistently inspect the IFIs by having a proper 
framework in place which allows them to make an assessment 
of IFIs’ shari‘a governance policies and tools to redress any 
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deficiencies. 
 
3. Dispute Settlement 
 
It would be an ideal development if the regulators initiated a 
special bench for Islamic finance cases as part of the court’s 
structure. In this special bench, the court may appoint judges 
who are knowledgeable in Islamic finance or the regulators may 
allocate a certain amount of funds to provide training for those 
judges. On top of that, a reliable shari‘a litigation system must 
also be in place. It is understood that in a secular legal 
environment, such as in the UK, the above arrangement is 
slightly difficult to implement. Therefore, it is important for the 
regulators in the secular legal environment to consider a court 
referral to a s h a r i ‘ a  board or a s h a r i ‘ a  expert to 
determine cases involving s h a r i ‘ a  issues. Alternatively, a 
special tribunal for Islamic finance cases may be established to 
handle disputes involving IFIs in this kind of jurisdiction. 
 
The policymakers should also take into account other legal avenues 
for dispute settlement, such as arbitration and mediation. At this 
point in time, there are several institutions for international dispute 
resolution, such as the Dubai Centre for Arbitration and Conciliation, 
the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, the Bahrain Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration Centre, the International 
Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, the 
London Court of International Arbitration, the Kuwait Centre for 
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Commercial Arbitration, the Kuala Lumpur Arbitration Centre and 
others. In view of these numerous arbitration centres, it is 
recommended that there should be one specific institution that offers 
alternative dispute resolutions and settlement for Islamic finance 
cases. Alternatively, the existing arbitration centres should develop 
and enhance their expertise and capabilities in Islamic finance in 
terms of resources, frameworks, procedures and facilities. At this 
point, these institutions for arbitration must prepare to facilitate 
themselves with necessary facilities and resources to address the need 
for dispute settlement involving Islamic finance cases. 
 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration, the decision or 
solution of the arbitration should be made binding and conclusive. The 
legally binding effect in arbitration is crucial for the purpose of ensuring 
credibility  and confidence in any solution made in the arbitration. In 
spite of that, it is also important for the regulators to encourage 
arbitration as an alternative legal avenue for dispute settlement and to 
issue policies and procedures that clearly acknowledge Islamic law as 
the main source of law as a basis for decision-making. 
 
 
4. Well-conceived By-laws and Internal Policies 
 
Well-conceived by-laws and internal policies are prerequisites of 
effective shari‘a governance. Realizing this, the IFIs should have 
appropriate by-laws and policies as guidelines for their internal use in 
terms of meeting procedures, decision-making, preparing reports and 
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dissemination of information, records and reviews. At this point, the 
IFSB-10 and the AAOIFI governance standards may be the basis for 
such by-laws, with some modifications that would be appropriate to 
be implemented within the local market and regulatory environment. 
 
D. Attributes of the shari‘a Board on Independence 
 
1. Method of Appointment 
There are significant differences  in the method  of appointment of the 
shari‘a board between IFIs. It is also found that numerous IFIs did not 
comply with the AAOIFI governance standards in that their 
appointments are made by the BOD and not the shareholders. In view 
of the actual market practice and more practical tools for ensuring 
independence, There are other mechanisms that would be appropriate 
to achieve such an objective. Firstly, the appointment  must  be  made  
either  by  the  BOD  or  the  shareholders.  Secondly,  the appointment 
must be subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. Thirdly, the 
appointment must not be permanent but rather contractual subject to 
renewal. Fourthly, the termination and dismissal must also be subject to 
the approval of the regulatory authorities. 
 
2. Code of Conduct 
 
The majority of IFIs do not have a code of ethics for shari‘a board. The 
existing practices seem to presume that shari‘a board members are 
bound by Islamic ethical principles. In view of the need to have a certain 
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and precise code of ethics specific and exclusive to the shari‘a board, 
the regulatory authorities as well as the IFIs may prescribe certain 
acceptable behaviour for shari‘a board members. It is incumbent upon 
the IFIs to initiate and develop an internal code of conduct for the shari‘a 
board. This code of ethics should be enforceable and there must be a 
mechanism within the organizational structure to ensure its strict 
implementation. Breach of this code of ethics may incur disciplinary 
action such as suspension, termination or other kinds of sanctions. 
 
3. Professional Body 
 
There is no professional body specifically established to set a standard 
practice for the shari‘a board as is the case for other professionals such 
as lawyers, accountants, medical practitioners and engineers. The 
establishment of a professional body to set the qualifications of the 
shari‘a board, to introduce a standard code of conduct, to develop a 
training programme and to enhance the professionalism of the shari‘a 
board is consider necessary at this point in time. At the moment, 
different bodies attempt to provide qualification programmes for shari‘a 
boards, such as the AAOIFI Certified shari‘a Adviser and Auditor, the 
Scholar Development Program initiated by the IFC Islamic finance 
council and the SII and the IBFIM shari‘a Scholars Introduction 
Program, but it was found that such qualifications have not been 
accepted universally. The study strongly recommends the 
establishment of The Association of 
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 Shari`a Advisors at the national and international levels.235 With this 
association, the quality of the shari‘a board can then also be rated by an 
independent agency similar to a credit-rating agency. 
 
4. Remuneration Policy 
 
There are significant differences in the remuneration of different shari‘a 
boards. The absence of any policy limitation or guidelines on the shari‘a 
board’s remuneration may lead to unhealthy practices. The top ten shari‘a 
scholars who dominated the board positions in IFIs around the world earn a 
very lucrative and significant amount of remuneration. It was found that a 
chairman of a shari‘a board could earn USD50,000 to USD100,000 per 
board and a top scholar could even gain up to USD250,000 on a typical 
capital markets deal. This study further estimates that the top five shari‘a 
scholars may earn up to a million dollars per year for servicing more than a 
hundred board and chairman positions around the world. While there is no 
standard benchmark or scale fee for  shari‘a advisors, the regulators as well 
as the IFIs should establish a specific policy for the remuneration of shari‘a 
board members based on the appropriate scale fees. In the context of the 
internal policy of IFIs, the shari‘a board scale fees should be approved by 
the shareholders and disclosed in the annual report. 
 
5. Attributes of the shari‘a Board on Confidentiality 
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There were shari‘a scholars who have unintentionally or indirectly disclosed 
some confidential information, particularly those sitting on  the boards of 
numerous IFIs. In addition, the survey results indicated that 29% of IFIs view 
that the shari‘a board is not fully aware of the issue of confidentiality. 
Realizing this, the IFIs should have a proper mechanism to resolve this 
issue and this includes terms of reference in the letter of appointment, 
enforcement of the code of ethics and disciplinary proceedings for any 
misconduct by the shari‘a board. In defining the scope of confidentiality, a 
reference may be made to section 52 of the IFSB-10. The IFSB-10 
nevertheless does not provide guidelines for disciplinary proceedings in the 
event that shari‘a board members breach confidentiality or disclose 
sensitive or confidential information. As such, the IFIs are recommended to 
have proper disciplinary proceedings, such as hearing procedures, and 
rules of evidence with an appropriate organizational structure. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Bay` Sale or contract of sale. 
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Bay` al-`Inah A contract involving the sale and buy-back transaction of assets 
by a seller. A seller sells an asset to a buyer on a cash basis and 
later buys it back on a deferred payment basis where the price is 
higher than the cash price. It can also be applied when a seller 
sells an asset to a buyer on a deferred basis and later buys it 
back on a cash basis, at a price which is lower than the deferred 
price  Commodity Murābahah A Murābahah-based purchase and sale transaction of Sharī`ah- 
compliant commodities, whereby the buyer purchases the 
commodities on a deferred payment basis and subsequently sells 
them to a third party on a cash payment basis. 
Darūrah Darūrah is an exigency in the event that if the necessary act is 
not done, then it shall lead to the destruction of five fundamental 
needs, namely religion, life, intelligence, progeny and property. 
The principle of Darūrah is only applicable in exceptional 
circumstances where the avoidance of the specific necessary act 
shall ruin the said fundamentals. 
Fatawa (singular Fatwa) A juristic opinion or pronouncement of facts given by the 
Sharī`ah board, a Mufti, or a Faqīh on any matter pertinent to 
Sharī`ah issues, based on the appropriate methodology. 
Gharar Deceptive uncertainty where details concerning the sale contract 
are unknown or uncertain. 
I`ādat Al Shirā’ Repurchase 
Ijārah An Ijārah contract is an agreement made by an institution 
offering Islamic financial services to lease to a customer an asset 
specified by the customer for an agreed period against specified 
instalments of lease rental. An Ijārah contract commences with 
a promise to lease that is binding on the part of the potential 
lessee prior to entering the Ijārah contract. 
Istisnā` An Istisnā` contract is an agreement to sell to a customer a non- 
existent asset, which is to be manufactured or built according to 
the buyer‟s specifications and is to be delivered on a specified 
future date at a pre-determined selling price. 
Kafālah Guarantee 
Kafālah bi al-Ujr Charging fee for guarantee 
Maslahah Public interest 
Maysir Gambling 
Mu`addal Ribh Mutaghayyar Floating rate 
Mu`addal Ribh Thābit Fixed rate 
Mubādalah Swap 
Mubādalah al-Arba`ah Profit rate swaps 
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Muḍārabah A Muḍārabah contract is an agreement between the capital provider 
and a skilled entrepreneur whereby the capital provider will contribute 
capital to an enterprise or activity, which is to be managed by the 
entrepreneur as the Muḍārib. Profits generated by that enterprise or 
activity are shared in accordance with the terms of the Muḍārabah 
agreement, whilst losses are to borne solely by the capital provider 
unless the losses are due to the Muḍārib’s misconduct, negligence or 
breach of contracted terms. 
Muḍārib Labour provider 
Murābahah A Murābahah contract is an agreement whereby the institution 
offering Islamic financial services sells to a customer a specified kind 
of asset that is already in their possession at cost plus an agreed profit 
margin (selling price). 
Mushārakah A Mushārakah contract is an agreement between the institution 
offering Islamic financial services and a customer to contribute capital 
to an enterprise, whether existing or new, or to own a real estate or 
moveable asset, either on a temporary or permanent basis. Profits 
generated by that enterprise or real estate/asset are shared in 
accordance with the terms of the Mushārakah agreement, whilst 
losses are shared in proportion to each partner‟s share of capital. 
Muslim A believer in or adherent of Islam. 
Qarḍ / Qarḍ al-Hasan A non-interest bearing loan intended to allow the borrower to use the 
loaned funds for a period with the understanding that the same amount 
of the loaned funds would be repaid at the end of the period. 
Rahn A contract to pledge a specified asset as security against a debt 
whereby the creditor (Murtahin) is entitled to hold custody of the 
asset. In the event of default by the debtor (Rāhin), the creditor may 
sell the asset. 
ReTakāful Islamic re-insurance 
Riba Usury 
Sadaqah (plural Sadaqāt) Donation 
Salam A Salam contract is an agreement to purchase, at a pre-determined 
price, a specified kind of commodity not available with the seller, 
which is to be delivered on a specified future date in a specified 
quantity and quality. The institution offering Islamic financial 
services, as the buyer, makes full payment of the purchase price upon 
execution of a Salam contract. The commodity may or may not be 
traded over the counter or on an exchange. 
Sharī`ah Divine Islamic law that encompasses all aspects of human life as 
revealed in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
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Sukūk (singular Sakk) Sukūk (certificates) each of which represents the holder‟s 
proportionate ownership in an undivided part of an underlying asset 
where the holder assumes all rights and obligations to such an asset. 
Tabarru’ Grant of property by a person with complete legal capacity without 
any compensation. In the context of Takāful operations, Tabarru’ is 
the amount of contribution to be relinquished by the Takāful 
participant as a donation for fulfilling the obligation of mutual help 
and to be used to pay claims submitted by eligible claimants. 
Tahawwut Hedging 
Takāful Takāful is derived from an Arabic word which means solidarity, 
whereby a group of participants agree among themselves to support 
one another jointly against a specified loss. In a Takāful arrangement, 
the participants contribute a sum of money as Tabarru’ (donation) 
into a common fund, which will be used for the mutual assistance of 
the members against specified loss or damage. 
Tawarruq Purchasing an asset with deferred price, either on the basis of 
Musawamah (sale contract without the disclosure of the asset cost 
price and profit margin to the buyer) or Murābahah, then selling it to 
a third party to obtain cash. 
Wa`d A promise to perform certain action(s) in the future. 
Wakālah An agency contract where the customer (principal) appoints the 
institution offering Islamic financial services as an agent (Wakīl) to 
carry out business on their behalf. 
Waqf (plural Awqāf) A property that produces income and that may have been deeded to 
benefit a community. 
Zakat Alms giving 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AAOIFI Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
ADR Advance‐deposit ratio 
ALA Alternative liquidity approaches 
ALFI Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry 
ASRR Advances to Stable Resources Ratio 
ATM Automated teller machine 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BCP Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
BDL Banque du Liban 
BIBF Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance 
BMI Broad Market Index 
BNM Bank Negara Malaysia 
BU Bottom-up 
CAGR Compound annual growth rate 
CAR Capital adequacy ratio 
CBB Central Bank of Bahrain 
CBRT Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
CBUAE Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates 
CDs Certificates of deposit 
CEBS Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
CFEB Consumer Financial Education Body 
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
CIB Credit Information Bureau 
CMF Collateralised Murābahah Facility 
CMT Commodity Murābahah transactions 
CPs Core principles 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
D-SIBs Domestic systemically important banks 
DJIM Dow Jones Islamic Market Indices 
DOF Department of Finance 
EBA European Banking Authority 
ECAIS External credit assessment institutions 
ECB European Central Bank 
ED Exposure Draft 
EIBOR Emirates Interbank Offer Rate 
ELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
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EMDEs Emerging market and developing economies 
Eurosif European Sustainable Investment Forum 
ESG Environmental, social and corporate governance 
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board 
ETFs Exchange traded funds 
EU European Union 
FCY Foreign currency 
FDR Financing-to-deposit ratio 
FIS Facilitating of Standards 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
FSL Financial stability law 
FX Foreign exchange 
GATE Global Commodity Finance Ltd. 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLP Gross loan portfolio 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service 
G-SIBs Global systematically important banks 
G-SIIs Global systemically important insurers 
G-SIFIs Global systematically important financial institutions 
HQLA High-quality liquid assets 
IADI International Association of Deposit Insurers 
IAHs Investment account holders 
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IBB Islamic Bank of Britain 
IBIs Islamic banks and Islamic banking windows 
ICs Investment Companies 
ICAAP Internal capital adequacy assessment process 
ICMM Islamic Capital and Money Market 
ICP Insurance Core Principles, Standards, Guidance and Assessment Methodology 
IDB Islamic Development Bank 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IFSB Islamic Financial Services Board 
IFSI Islamic financial services industry 
IIBOR Islamic Interbank Offered Rate 
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IIFM International Islamic Financial Market 
IIFS Institutions offering Islamic financial services 
IILM International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation 
IIMM Islamic Interbank Money Market 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INCEIF International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance 
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 
IRR Investment risk reserve 
IRTI Islamic Research and Training Institute 
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. 
ISLI Islamic Sukūk Liquidity Instrument 
LCR Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
LCY Local currency 
LIBOR London Interbank Offer Rate 
LOLR Lender of last resort 
MDIC Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MFBs Microfinance Banks 
MFIs Microfinance Institutions 
NGOs Non-governmental organisations 
NPF Non-performing financing 
NPLs Non-performing loans 
NSFR Net Stable Funding Ratio 
ODTIs Other deposit taking institutions 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OIC Organization of Islamic Conferences 
OMOs Open market operations 
OTC Over-the-counter 
PIF Participants‟ Investment Fund 
PMN Pakistan Microfinance Network 
POS Point-of-sale 
PRF Participants‟ Risk Fund 
PRI Principles for Responsible Investment 
PSE Public sector entities 
PSIA Profit-sharing investment accounts 
QIS Quantitative Impact Study 
RI Responsible investment 
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ROA Return on assets 
ROE Return on equity 
RSAs Regulatory and supervisory authorities 
RSPs Rural Support Programmes 
SAG Standards and Guiding Principles 
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
SBBA Sale and Buy-Back Agreement 
SBIS Sharī`ah-based Bank Indonesia Certificate 
SBP State Bank of Pakistan 
SEA South-East Asia 
SHF Shareholders‟ Fund 
SIFIs Systemically important financial institutions 
SKRAs Strategic Key Result Areas 
SLOLR Sharī`ah-compliant lender of last resort 
SLR Statutory Liquidity Requirement 
SMEs Small- and medium-sized enterprises 
S&P Standard & Poor‟s 
SPP Strategic Performance Plan 
SRI Socially responsible investment 
SSS Scripless Securities Settlement 
TD Top-down 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNEP FI United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council 
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund 
UPSIA Unrestricted profit-sharing investment accounts 
US United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Players in Corporate Governance (CG) of Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
 
Environment Important Issues Objectives/ Responsibilities in CG 
   
Government 
(Laws and Regulations 
for IFIs) 
Laws facilitating operations 
of Islamic financial 
institutions 
Provide clear laws and 
regulations that cater to the 
needs of IFIs. 
Accounting System Accounting and Audit 
standards for clear and 
transparent communication of 
information 
Provide uniform, clear and 
transparent accounting 
standards 
Public Institutions   
Supervisors Stability and soundness of 
the financial system 
(eliminate systemic risk) 
Develop internal controls, 
risk management procedures, 
and standards of transparency 
Provide Guidelines for FIs 
Monitor overall operations in 
general and risky behavior in 
particular 
Banking Associations Provide minimum standards of 
CG 
Set Principles and Sound 
practices 
Institutional   
Shareholders Shareholder Rights Elect board members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Share in profit  
Board of Directors Ensure good management 
team 
Oversight of management 
Protect shareholders and 
investment depositors rights 
Set overall policy and 
strategy 
Accountability of the 
management 
Senior Management Operate the institution 
efficiently. 
Right balance between risk 
and return 
Efficient incentive-structure 
Implement the policies set by 
the board in a sound and 
responsible manner 
Internal Audit Quality and quantity of 
information 
Transparency of information 
Ensure that the policies set by 
Board are followed by the 
management (Compliance) 
Employees Skills and work ethics 
Right incentive-structure 
Meet the goals set by the 
management 
Minimize operational risks 
 Shari`a Boards Set shari‘a related rules and 
principles 
Oversee compliance with its 
verdict 
Others   
Depositors Good service 
Comparable returns 
Act responsibly 
Monitor the performance 
External Auditors Quality and quantity of 
information 
Transparency of information 
Evaluate the accuracy of the 
quality and quantity of 
information 
 Shari`a  Audit Adherence to the  Shari`a Ensure compliance with the 
 Shari`a Board verdicts. 
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Figure 3:  Key Players in Corporate Governance of Islamic Financial Institutions 
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